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Bourdieu and American Legal Education:
How Law Schools Reproduce Social
Stratification and Class Hierarchy
LUCILLE A. JEWELt

INTRODUCTION

I became interested in the intersection between class
and the legal education while attending a Continuing Legal
Education seminar on strategies for success in the practice
of law. At this seminar, the speaker gave an hour-long
presentation on professional style and manners for
attorneys, with lessons on how to shake someone's hand
effectively, what types of attire make the most professional
impression, and which fork to use at an upscale restaurant.
This speaker's thesis was that attorneys need to master
various etiquette rules in order to reach their full potential
as practitioners. While sitting and listening to this wellintentioned speaker, I realized that I was essentially
listening to a lesson on upper-class manners and clothing
styles.
I then thought back to similar lessons that I have
taught as a moot court coach and advocacy teacher. Before
going to a job interview or an oral argument, I advise my
students to take out their visible body piercings, hide their
tattoos, avoid wearing too much perfume, leave the flashy

t Assistant Professor, Atlanta's John Marshall Law School. J.D. 2000, Tulane
University School of Law; B.A. 1996, Columbia University. I would like to thank
Professors Martha McCluskey and Athena Mutua for organizing the ClassCrits
workshops and for engendering such a supportive atmosphere for young critical
scholars. I am grateful to Professors Jeffrey Van Detta, Kamina Pinder, and
Kathleen Burch, whose comments, guidance, and encouragement kept me on
the right track and enabled me to complete this project. Finally, I would like to
thank my research assistant, Cara Rockhill, for applying her powerful editing
skills to this piece on such short notice.
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jewelry at home, and-avoid polyester at all costs. As I
looked back on the substance of these lessons, I realized
that I have been teaching my students to wear attire
traditionally associated with the upper-class in America. I
began to see other lessons on proper grammar, diction, and
professional conduct as advocacy of upper-class mores. I
wrestled with the idea that I was becoming the law school
version of Henry Higgins.1 Should I be more critical of these
class-based lessons that I am teaching? Or, would that
criticism hurt my students and prevent them from
acquiring the skills they need in order to succeed at
practicing law?
With these questions in mind, I decided to research the
issue of class as it relates to legal education. In order to do
this, I needed to find a class theory that could be applied to
both the American legal profession and legal education. In
terms of a theory of class for the legal profession, some
theorists would stop the inquiry upon classifying attorneys,
in terms of economic income, as members of the uppermiddle-class. Although most would agree that in economic
terms, the legal profession is a middle-class/upper-class
profession, there are undeniable multi-dimensional
striations that exist within the legal profession. 2 Pierre
Bourdieu's work is relevant to the legal profession because
it allows inquiry into these professional differences, by
analyzing the amount of social and cultural capital a person

1. GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, PYGMALION (Penguin Books 2003).

2. See, e.g., FRANCES KAHN ZEMANS & VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, THE MAKING OF
A PUBLIC PROFESSION 42 (1981) ("For while the law in comparison with other
occupations carries with it relatively high social status, the legal profession is
far from monolithic."); Ronit Dinovitzer & Bryant C. Garth, Lawyer Satisfaction
in the Process of Structuring Legal Careers, 41 L. & Soc'Y REV. 1, 2 (2007)
("Decades of work on the legal profession have confirmed that there are
hierarchies in the profession that every lawyer knows."); RONIT DINOVITZER ET
AL., AFTER THE JD: FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 42
(2004),
http://www.nalpfoundation.org/webmodules/articles/articlefiles/87AfterJD 2004_web.pdf (detailing significant economic differences between
lawyers, mapped by practice area and geographic location). See also JOHN P.
HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (2005).
Urban Lawyers contains the results of a detailed sociological study of the
Chicago Bar conducted in 1995. This study followed up on a previous study of
the Chicago legal profession conducted in 1975. See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0.
LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (Russell Sage
Found. 1982). The data collected by this study illustrates the social and
economic striations within the Chicago Bar.
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holds, in addition to economic capital. For instance,
distinctions among members of the legal profession can be
viewed in terms of differences in economic capital (some
attorneys make much more money than others) 3 ;
differences in power relations in the workplace (some
attorneys exercise managerial authority; others do not); and
what Bourdieu refers to as "symbolic capitar '4 (levels of
prestige and honor assigned based on credentials).
I was also drawn to Bourdieu because he devoted so
much of his research to educational institutions. A central
theme of his work is that educational institutions
contribute to societal inequality because those who achieve
the most within the system tend to have entered the system5
with a greater amount of social and monetary resources.
But the economic structures that underlie the allocation of
power through educational credentials are hidden in the
educational system, by narratives that focus on individual
merit and ability, measured in objective terms. 6 Finally,
Bourdieu was concerned about the ways in which
educational pedagogy works to create a collective attitude
that causes individuals to docilely accept their place within
the greater social structure, without question. 7 Thus,
despite its egalitarian and democratic ideals, western
education contributes to inequality by allowing "inherited
cultural differences to shape academic achievement and

3. Another way to describe the stratification within the legal profession is to
view it in terms of what type of clients attorneys represent. See, e.g., Randolph
N. Jonakait, The Two Hemispheres of Legal Education and the Rise and Fall of
Local Law Schools, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 863, 868 (2006-07) (citing HEINZ ET
AL., supra note 2, at 868). The attorneys at the top of the hierarchical structure
of lawyers represent large corporations. See id. at 864. Attorneys at the bottom
primarily represent personal clients. See id. Attorneys who have corporations
for clients receive substantially more income in the form of higher legal fees
than attorneys who represent individual clients. See id.
4. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 182-83 (Richard

Nice trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1977). For instance, attorneys who work at
large law firms, representing corporate clients, are viewed as having much more
prestige than attorneys who engage in individual client representation. See also
HEINZ ETAL., supranote 2, at 77-97.
5. DAVID SWARTZ, CULTURE AND POWER: THE SOCIOLOGY OF PIERRE BOURDIEU

189-90 (1997).
6. PIERRE BOURDIEU & JEAN-CLAUDE
PASSERON, REPRODUCTION
EDUCATION, SOCIETY AND CULTURE 163 (Sage Publ'n Ltd. 2d prtg. 1990).

7. See id. at 31-35.
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occupational attainment."8 I found that much of what
Bourdieu wrote about the tiered quality of French higher
education to be applicable to American legal education.
There is also an important moral dimension within
Bourdieu's theories. In speaking to fellow sociologists and
academics, Bourdieu urged his colleagues to uncover and
publicize the myths that lead to structural subordination.
But he also cautioned theorists not to ignore potential
conflicts between an objective view of social structures and
an individual's conscious subjective view of herself. I found
the moral aspects of Bourdieu's theories compelling because
they addressed my own internal conflict as a teacher at a
low-tier institution where many students are the first in
their family to receive a professional degree. I would like
my students to succeed in the practice of law and enjoy the
higher status in society that a law license affords, but I do
not want them to so blindly embrace the law's aristocratic
ideals that they do not see how the professional culture
produces inequality and division. I am also concerned with
the thought that, just like Henry Higgins and Eliza
Doolittle, if I teach my students how to master the upperclass culture of the law, there is still no guarantee that the
legal profession will return the favor and accept my
students as bona fide members. Thus, in this Essay, I look
for a middle ground that would allow students to learn the
rules and mores required in order to succeed as attorneys,
but also become critically aware of how these rules and
mores mask hidden processes that tend to reproduce
institutional and societal structures, which in turn produce
outcomes that favor advantaged groups at the expense of
the disadvantaged.
SOURCES CONSULTED

Bourdieu's work spans the disciplines of anthropology,
sociology, education, and history. 9 Because of the breadth of
his work, there is danger of a misreading if one merely

8. SWARTZ, supra note 5, at 190.
9. See Loic J.D. Wacquant, Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and
Logic of Bourdieu's Sociology, in AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 1, 2
(Pierre Bourdieu & Loic J.D. Wacquant eds., 1992).
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chooses individually digestible pieces to work from. 10 In
researching this Essay, I have tried to avoid the fallacy of a
myopic view by looking at several of Bourdieu's writings,
including: his anthropological fieldwork conducted on a precapitalist society in Kabylia, Algeria"1 ; his exposition on
taste and class12 ; his study, with Jean Claude Passeron of
education13 ; and Loic J.D. Wacquant's explanations of
Bourdieu's theories found in the book, addressed to
sociology students, co-written with Bourdieu. 14 To help me
understand the context of Bourdieu, I have also consulted
Elliot B. Weininger's Foundations of Pierre Bourdieu's
Class Analysis, found in Erik Olin Wright's Approaches to
Class Analysis,15 as well as David Swartz's Culture and
Power.16 I also reviewed Bourdieu's recent essays on the
suffering borne out by disadvantaged persons in
contemporary France. 17 Finally, I looked at Bourdieu's
general essay on the field of the law and the cultural
production of law (which draws upon examples from French
and American legal systems).' 8
I.

BOURDIEU'S THEORIES-A FOUNDATIONAL EXPLANATION

A. Types of Capital
For Bourdieu, class analysis is not a matter of
classifying and placing individuals into pre-defined groups,
10. See id. at 4.
11. BOURDIEU, supra note 4, at 182-83.
12. PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT
[SIC] OF TASTE (Richard Nice trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1984).

13. BOURDIEU & PASSERON, supra note 6.
14. Wacquant, supra note 9.
15. Elliot B. Weininger, Foundationsof PierreBourdieu's Class Analysis, in
APPROACHES TO CLASS ANALYSIS 82, 82-118 (Erik Olin Wright ed., Cambridge

Univ. Press 2005).
16. SWARTZ, supranote 5.

17. Pierre Bourdieu & Patrick Champagne, Outcasts on the Inside, in THE
421, 42224 (Pierre Bourdieu et al. eds., Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson et al. trans.,
Stanford Univ. Press 1999).
18. Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of the Law: Toward A Sociology of the
JuridicalField, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 806 (Richard Terdiman trans., 1987).
WEIGHT OF THE WORLD: SOCIAL SUFFERING IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
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such as the working-class, the middle-class, and the upperclass. 19 Rather, a person's class is determined by looking at
how much and what types of capital a person has
(economic, cultural, social, and symbolic), and how long the
person has held that type of capital. 20 Thus, the term "class"
can be defined as a person's specific place within a social
sphere or field,21 as determined by the22value, composition,
and trajectory of one's capital holdings.
To determine class location, the most important factor
is the volume of capital that a person has. 23 The overall
amount of capital a person holds determines what class
level she resides at.24 Factors two and three, the
composition of one's capital and the temporal trajectory of
one's holdings, determine where a person will be situated
within her class level. 25 The different types of capital
cultural
include:
economic (money and property);
(education, consumer practices/tastes); social (family or
political connections); and symbolic (authority and
prestige). 26 A person can hold different types of capital and
each type is valuable in determining one's class status. For
instance, a person with little economic capital but a larger
amount of cultural capital (such as a teacher or professor)
will generally reside in the same class as a "rags to riches"
entrepreneur, who has much money, but little cultural and
social capital in the form of education or family

19. See BOURDIEU & PASSERON, supra note 6, at 11; SWARTZ, supra note 5, at
39; Weininger, supra note 15, at 86. The task of demarcating classes and class
locations has been identified as more of a Marxist approach to class analysis,
where individuals are placed in a class based on their occupation and
relationship with the means of production. See, e.g., ERIK OLIN WRIGHT, CLASS
COUNTS: COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN CLASS ANALYSIS (Cambridge Univ. Press

1997).
20. See BOURDIEU, supra note 12, at 114.

21. See Wacquant, supra note 9, at 17. A field is an arena of play, analogous
to a battlefield, where players compete to establish control over the types of
capital contained in the field, such as cultural and legitimate authority. See id.
22. See Weininger, supra note 15, at 89.
23. See BOURDIEU, supra note 12, at 114.
24. See id. at 114-15.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 114; SWARTZ, supranote 5, at 43, 74, 78.
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connections. 27 The difference is that these two persons will
reside in different spaces within their field.28 The final
factor concerns changes in capital volume and composition
over time, as "manifested by past and potential trajectory in
social space. ' 29 For instance, whether a person is "old
money" or "nouveau riche" is a question that relates to this
third factor, which determines where, in the upper-class
space, a person resides. Finally, although he views class in
fluid terms, Bourdieu shares the Marxist view that
dominant groups can be expected, as a matter of
course, to
30
subordinate weaker groups in inequitable ways.
B. Valuing the Symbolic
For Bourdieu, existing class structures within a field
and within a society are reproduced when each new
participant learns to accept, without question, an accepted
value for symbolic capital and the placement that results
from a person's capital holdings. Bourdieu created the
concepts of habitus, objectification, and symbolic violence to
explain the process of how class structures come to be
internalized and replicated by members of a society.
1. Habitus, objectification, and symbolic violence.
"Habitus," according to Bourdieu, is a series of preferences
and dispositions that cause persons to behave a certain way
and see the world in a certain way. 31 Habitus is created
through a process of objectification, which occurs when a
person internalizes the world's external hierarchical
structures into her mental structures, which creates a
worldview that the person takes for granted as the way the
world works. 32 An important point here, necessary to
understand the domination component of Bourdieu's theory,

27. See BOURDIEU,supranote 12, at 115.
28. See id.

29. See id. at 114.
30. See SWARTZ, supra note 5, at 39 ("[Bourdieu] accepts from historical
materialism the primacy of class conflict and material interests as fundamental
pillars of social inequality in modern societies.").
31. See Wacquant, supranote 9, at 18 & n.33.
32. See BOURDIEU, supra note 4, at 164-65. The concept of objectification,
which Bourdieu sometimes referred to as misrecognition, has been analogized to
the Marxist concept of false consciousness. See SWARTZ, supranote 5, at 39.
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is that habitus evolved from a system in which dominant
groups used physical coercion to maintain the established
order. 33 Dominant groups foster the habitus, along with
other institutional mechanisms, to provide a more efficient
(as opposed to physical coercion) method for reproducing
the established order because it enables the dominated
to
34
complicitly participate in their own domination.
Habitus becomes ingrained when individuals in a given
culture, through the process of objectification, agree upon
the value of symbolic capital, such as honor, prestige, and
credit. 35 Putting an agreed upon value on symbolic capital
reinforces the "well-grounded illusion that the value of
symbolic goods is inscribed in the nature of things, just as
36
interest in these goods is inscribed in the nature of men."
Modern society's placement of an unquestioned, agreedupon value for symbolic capital allows domination to occur
in a self-automated way-the dominating actors do not
have to constantly prove the value
of the symbolic goods to
37
create demand in the dominated.
The creation of a habitus through objectification
enables a society to switch from violent domination-where
one individual exercises force over another individual, such
as what occurs in slavery-to symbolic violence, where
individuals participate in their own subordination to obtain
symbolic capital, such as honor or prestige. 38 Bourdieu
provides an example of symbolic violence, occurring in a
pre-capitalist society, when peasants agree to work (for very
little renumeration) for a prestigious landowner in
exchange for gifts 39 and the honor and prestige of being
associated with that landowner. 40 Because there is a
collective understanding of what these symbolic goods are

33. See BOURDIEU, supranote 4, at 82, 190-91.
34. See id. at 190-92.
35. See id. at 182.
36. Id. at 183.
37. See id. at 183-84.
38. See id. at 179, 190-92.
39. In the Kabylia societies that Bourdieu studied, gifts did not have as
much economic value as symbolic value. See id. at 192-93. "[A] present in which
what counts is not so much what you give as the way you give it ..." Id.
40. See id. at 182.
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worth (gifts and prestige), the peasant agreeably
participates in his own domination; physical coercion is no
longer necessary.
2. Habitus and Rational Choice Theory. At this point, a
law and economics theorist might ask whether this
exchange of labor for prestige is in fact coercive. Instead of
coercion, could the exchange be the result of a market
41
exchange where both actors are exercising free choice?
Bourdieu's response to such a question would be three-fold.
First, in this early example of symbolic violence, the
landlord would have resorted to brute coercion of the
42
peasant's labor if the symbolic exchange did not work.
Thus, the threat of physical coercion, which shadows all
symbolic exchanges in varying degrees, conflicts with the
idea of choice. Second, the theory of objectification, or
misrecognition, posits that persons are not usually in a
position to make a purely free choice because a person's
decisions are produced in part by her habitus. 43 Assuming
the symbolic system works in the peasant/landlord
example, the peasant works for the landlord in exchange for
symbolic capital, not because he has a choice, but because it
is the only course of conduct the habitus produces in his
mind. In other words, persons believe that they are making
choices but these choices are limited 44
by ingrained
expectations of what they can realistically do.
41. Such a question draws upon the implicit assumption within law and

economics theory, that outcomes are a product of actors making rational choices
in order to maximize profits and utility. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin &
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2000)
(explaining the concept of rational choice within the law and economics theory).
The idea within liberal individualism that "individuals exist separate from and
prior to their social environment and have the ability to choose their values and
ends" is another premise that underlies rational choice theory. Susan D. Carle,
Theorizing Agency, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 307, 325 (2005).

42. See BOURDIEU, supranote 4, at 191-92.
43. See id. at 164-65; SWARTZ, supranote 5, at 39.
44. See BOURDIEU, supra note 4, at 77 (explaining that the habitus causes
persons to believe they are choosing a course of action even where such
outcomes are inevitable). For a description of how habitus operates to produce a
sense of choice in attorneys, see Dinovitzer & Garth, supra note 2, at 3
(explaining that individual "choices and expectations that reproduce patterns of
stratification, so long as we recall that the 'dispositions that incline them
toward this complicity are themselves the effect, embodied, of domination"')
(citation omitted).
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On this point, Bourdieu has been criticized for his
structural determinism, in which subordinated individuals
are passive victims of a socially constructed environment45
without the agenic ability to transform social structures.
On the other hand, others view Bourdieu's habitus concept
as an improvement over other forms of structuralism
because the habitus mediates between individuals and
action, allowing individuals some agency in determining
their outcomes. 46 A final Bourdiesian response to a rational
choice theorist would be that access to the same
opportunities to participate in market exchanges is not
available equally to every person.4 7 The availability of
choices, the ability to make a "rational" choice, and the
outcomes that flow from those choices, are determined by
accumulated and inherited capital in its economic, social,
cultural, and symbolic forms. 48 The landlord would have
enjoyed a wider array of choices than the peasant. Thus,
the idea that social outcomes are a product of an actor's free
choice in the market is a myth that masks the fact that
most differential social outcomes result from pre-existing
differences in capital holdings. Like the myth of merit that I
discuss in a later section, 49 the free choice/rational choice
theory allows dominant groups another narrative to justify
their status and evade inquiries into the inequality and
unfairness that produces their advantaged position.

45. See

David

Gartman,

Culture as

Class Symbolization or Mass

Reification?A Critique of Bourdieu'sDistinction, 97 AM. J. Soc. 421, 422 (1991).
46. See, e.g., Carle, supra note 41, at 370-71 (explaining the view that
Bourdieu's theory does allow for some agenic control). Bourdieu himself argued
that the habitus concept has some room for agency, since in some instances,
"[t]he lines of action suggested by habitus may very well be accompanied by a
strategic calculation of costs and benefits." Pierre Bourdieu & Loc J.D.
Wacquant, The Purpose of Reflexive Sociology (The Chicago Workshop), in AN
INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY, supra note 9, at 61, 131. Though Bourdieu
denied that he engaged in structural determinism, he did not develop any detail
of how agency is practiced in the habitus model.
47. See, e.g., Pierre Bourdieu, Forms of Capital, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF
ECONOMIC LIFE 96, 98-99 (Mark Granovetter & Richard Swedberg eds., 2d ed.
2001).
48. See Bourdieu & Wacquant, supra note 46, at 124-25 (explaining that the
attributes of a rational choice actor "can only be acquired under definite social
and economic conditions").
49. See infra Part II.
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3. Symbolic Violence and the Law. As societies develop
into modern capitalistic states, symbolic violence begins to
occur systematically, that is, through processes that ensure
"the reproduction of the established order by its own
motion."50 Bourdieu identified the law as one such
mechanism that enables symbolic violence to operate in
modern democratic societies. 51 The production of law (which
Bourdieu referred to as "the juridical process") converts
"direct conflict between directly concerned parties into
juridically regulated debate between professionals acting by
proxy." 52 Persons on the outside of the legal field (lay
persons) must "submit to the 'power of form,' that is, to the
symbolic violence perpetrated by those who, thanks to their
knowledge of formalization and proper judicial manners,
are able to put the law on their side."53 By maintaining a
logical and aristocratic detachment, lawyers and judges are
able to maintain the symbolic value of the legal system as a
neutral and trustworthy way for resolving disputes,
obscuring the fact that the law allows powerful groups to
impose their vision of social order onto the less powerful. 54
Thus, for Bourdieu, common law and civil law processes
encapsulate symbolic violence because the subordinated
participate in their own subordination by allowing their
disputes to be resolved through a process that favors the
positions of socially dominant groups. 55
C. Education and the Reproduction of Class Structure
Bourdieu
theorized
that
modern
educational
institutions are uniquely situated
to foster the
objectification process, thus playing a major role in
reproducing a society's class structures. Democratic
educational systems 56 replicate existing class structures by
50. BOURDIEU, supra note 4, at 189-90.
51. See id. at 188; Bourdieu, supra note 18.
52. Bourdieu, supra note 18, at 831.
53. Id. at 850.
54. See id. at 844, 848.
55. See generally id. at 839-50.
56. Bourdieu based his theories on the ethnographic research conducted on
French secondary and post-secondary education. However, he recognized that
his theories would apply to American secondary and post-secondary schools,
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giving the school the authority to communicate meanings
that have the function of reproducing the arbitrary 57 way
that groups
are organized. 58 Educational
systems
communicate meanings that favor the interests of the
dominant class in three ways. First, educators teach in a
way that mirrors the dominant culture through methods
that are sanctioned by the dominant culture, 59 producing a
student habitus that sees the pre-existing organizational
structure as the natural way that things are. 60 Second,
schools reinforce the theme that success is a product of
individual merit or an innate gift, rather than any sort of
inherited capital, economic or symbolic. 61 Finally, by giving
socially approved sanctions an economic value, the
educational system adheres to a structure that
tends to
2
reproduce economically-based social hierarchies.6
Bourdieu used the example of language to explain how
teachers mirror and reinforce the dominant culture. In
France, teachers must use "university" language, the
abstract and detached language of the upper-class, or lose
authority.6 3 Teachers can also be expected to use upperclass language because they are teaching in the way that
they were taught. 64 By using the language of the dominant
class, the teacher encourages the belief that this language
is the proper language, thus reproducing the dominant
class's language and culture in her students.6 5 This
teaching causes students to recognize the legitimacy of the
dominant culture, but to also see the illegitimacy of their
which are stratified into tiers, much like French schools. See BOURDIEU &
PASSERON, supranote 9, at xi.
57. Bourdieu defined "arbitrary" as something that "cannot be deduced from
a universal principle, whether physical, biological or spiritual." Id. at 8. That
groups are organized one way over another is arbitrary when you look at the
way that groups are organized in the "sum total of present or past cultures or,
by imaginary variation, to the universe of possible cultures." Id.
58. See id. at 5-11.
59. See id. at 27.
60. See id. at 31-35.
61. See id. at 20-21, 167.
62. See id. at 152-53.
63. See id. at 123-26.
64. See id. at 26, 60.
65. See id. at 123-26.
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own subordinated culture. 66 Thus, students come to view an
upper-class way of speaking as "proper" and more literal or
colorful language employed as "vulgar. ' 67 Throughout the
does not see the arbitrary
learning process, the student
68
nature of these distinctions.
how the French
also demonstrates
Language
success and rank
the
fact
that
educational system hides
(such
as inherited
arbitrary
factors
might result from
order
to
succeed, a
capital) rather than innate ability. In
69
early.
A student
language
student must master "proper"
(a
form
of
cultural
capital"
"linguistic
who has inherited
language
transmitted
capital) by being exposed to complex
by her family will have an advantage over students whose
70
family members do not speak in a school sanctioned way.
Moreover, schools mask the importance of inherited
cultural capital, such as linguistic capital, by defining
"aptitude" in terms of individual merit and grades rather
than as 7a product of "socially qualified teaching and
learning." 1
In addition to using merit to mask the social factors
that produce academic success, members of dominant
groups will often devalue the performance of students who
do not come to school with much educational or cultural
capital. For instance, working class students who master
the language skills necessary to enter post-secondary
education in France are nonetheless subject to claims that
their speaking is too "forced" and does not demonstrate
"ease and distinction or university tone and breeding." 72
They simply do not have "the 'gift"' required for academic
success.73 Performance-based evaluations, such as oral
examinations, lend themselves to class bias because the
examiner has the authority to pass judgment using "the
unconscious criteria of social perception on total persons,
66. See id. at 41-42.
67. Id. at 118; see id. at 116-17, 123-26.
68. See id. at 11-15.
69. Id. at 118; see id. at 158-59.
70. Id. at 73.
71. Id. at 163-64.
72. Id. at 119, 162; see id. at 130.
73. Id. at 130.
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whose moral and intellectual qualities are grasped through
the infinitesimals of style or manners, accent '74
or elocution,
posture or mimicry, even clothing or cosmetics.
In addition to producing the habitus, or the mental
acceptance of a society's divisional structures, evaluative
examination systems reproduce pre-existing economic
differences between groups. The French examination
system that Bourdieu studied places students into
hierarchical tiers, which tend to reflect pre-existing
economic and social differences between students.7 5 The
system is "democraticized" in that secondary schools are
open to students from all classes.7 6 However, it is a tiered
system: students who do well on exams at all stages of their
education end up at "elite," "prestigious" secondary schools,
whereas students who do less well on these tests end up at
marginalized institutions focusing on technical skills (as
opposed to the skills that would enable a student to get into
post-secondary schools).7 7 French post-secondary schooling
appears to have a similar hierarchy, also based on prestige
and distinction. 78 Low-status students, excluded from the
elite institutions and unable to see the arbitrary nature of
the selection system, internalize the ideology of merit and
adopt the belief that they deserve to be excluded as a
79
matter of course.
Degrees and diplomas from the various tiers within the
French educational system are given different economic
values, depending on their place in the hierarchy. The
differing economic values conferred on academic degrees
can also be viewed as a status closure device.80

74. See id. at 162.
75. See id. at 153-59, 167.
76. See id. at 158-59.
77. See id. at 158-59.
78. See id. at 165.
79. See id. at 4-19, 208-10. See also Bourdieu & Champagne, supra note 17,
at 421.
80. See BoURDIEU, supra note 12, at 133. See also William C. Kidder, The
Bar Examination and the Dream Deferred: A Critical Analysis of the MBE,
Social Closure, and Racial and Ethnic Stratification,29 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 547,
548-49 (2004) (describing Bourdieu as a social closure theorist).
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When class fractions who previously made little use of the school
system enter the race for academic qualifications, the effect is to
force the groups whose reproduction was mainly or exclusively
achieved through education to step up their investments so as to
maintain the relative scarcity of their qualifications and,
consequently, their position in the class structure. Academic
qualifications and the school system which awards them thus
become one of the key stakes in an interclass competition which
generates a general and continuous growth in the8 1demand for
education and an inflation of academic qualifications.

Thus, the type of job and salary available to a graduate
depends on the degree to which the student's academic
qualifications "have been consecrated by the school and
university. '8 2 Within the same professional post, a graduate
with indispensable technical skills but with marginal
academic qualifications is paid less than someone with a
degree from a more prestigious and elite institution.8 3 The
privileged students who do well at all stages of their
academic career end up with the most prestigious highpaying jobs.8 4 The disadvantaged, who struggled to get
through the system, most likely receive a degree worth very
little.8 5 By obscuring the self-preservation interests served
by these status closure devices, and instead linking a
graduate's hierarchical placement to individual merit, the
educational system replicates existing social structures and
the privileged receive
disguises the unfair ways in which
the most benefits from the system.8 6
D. Symbolic Consumption-Taste
In addition to studying how institutions replicate and
reproduce class structures in society, Bourdieu also
analyzed the creation of individual class identities through
the consumption of goods. A major premise underlying
Bourdieu's fieldwork in Distinction: A Social Critique of

81. See BoURDIEU, supra note 12, at 133.

82. See BOURDIEU & PASSERON, supra note 6, at 4-19, 208-10.
83. See id. at 167.
84. See Bourdieu & Champagne, supra note 17, at 423-25.
85. See id.
86. See id.
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Taste, is that social participants construct class identities
through symbolic consumptive and behavioral practices.8 7
Participants located near each other in a social space will
exercise similar behavioral and consumer choices, sharing a
similar lifestyle.88 The ranking and ordering of lifestyle
choices is completed through the exercise of taste, which
translates these choices into signs that have different
hierarchical values.8 9 Because the dominant class has the
most access to media forums in which cultural taste can be
defined (e.g. theater reviews, etc.) and because taste is the
internalized reflection of the existing social order (where
the dominant class has the power), the dominant class is
able to allocate value to different behavioral and consumer
practices. 90
Bourdieu noted, "[e]very group tends to set up the
means of perpetuating itself beyond the finite individuals in
whom it is incarnated." 91 One way that groups do this is
through representation and symbolization, which can come
in concrete form (such as a tombstone or statue) but which
can also appear through the display of taste and manners. 92
Thus, the outward display of manners and symbolic goods
showing the purchaser's taste cements the "unconscious
unity of a class" through "bodily experiences. '93
A major opposition that determines the rank of a
particular lifestyle is that of distinction versus vulgarity,
which operates on a system of supply and demand. 94
Distinctive practices are ranked high because they are rare
and difficult to obtain whereas vulgar practices are ranked
low because they are "easy [to obtain] and common. '95 By
way of example, from Bourdieu's study of consumer

87. See Weininger, supranote 15, at 92.
88. See BoURDIEU, supra note 12, at 167-77.
89. See id. at 174-75.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 72.
92. See id. at 77.
93. The bodily experience may be "as profoundly unconscious as the quiet
caress of beige carpets or the thin clamminess of tattered, garish linoleum, the
harsh smell of bleach or perfumes as imperceptible as a negative scent." Id.
94. See id. at 176.
95. See id.
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practices in 1970s France, the upper-class approved the use
of highly censored language and slow gestures, signaling
verbal
passivity and restraint, but found spontaneous
96
outspokenness, agitation, and haste to be vulgar.
In displays of taste, the privileged rely on a "sense of
distinction" and signal their status through an
"ostentatious discretion, sobriety and understatement. '97
The display of "legitimate manners" is especially valuable
because manners "manifest the rarest conditions of
acquisition, that is, a social power over time which is tacitly
recognized as the supreme excellence: to possess things
from the past."9 8 Occasionally, members of the dominated
classes seek to co-opt a marker of a higher social status and
bluff their way into a higher social condition. 99 The example
given is when one adopts body language that signals the
"self-confidence, ease and authority of someone who feels
authorized." 100 The bluff is only successful if the
participants higher up in the structure believe that a
distinguished demeanor is an authentic signifier of the
person's higher condition. 10 1
E. The Moral Dimension of Bourdieu's Theory
Bourdieu argued that academics and intellectuals have
a moral duty to uncover and demystify the myths of
institutional domination. 10 2 If one accepts the premise that
symbolic values help constitute the system of social order,
then changing and questioning the values we place on the
symbolic may "transform the world."' 0 3 However, in order to
oppose dominant social structures, the educational "insider"
must overcome two paradoxes: the liar's paradox 10 4 and the
subjective
paradox that arises when a person's
96. See id. at 177.
97. Id. at 249.
98. Id. at 71.
99. See id. at 252-53.
100. Id. at 252.
101. See id. at 253.
102. See Wacquant, supranote 9, at 14; Weininger, supra note 15, at 117-18.
103. Wacquant, supra note 9, at 14.
104. See BOURDIEU & PASSERON, supranote 6, at 12.
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understanding
of herself conflicts with violent class
105
structures.
Bourdieu posits that all teachers who try to speak in
opposition from within become embroiled in a liar's
paradox: "[w]hat I am telling you is a lie."'1 06 This paradox
arises because educational institutions' implicit role in the
propagation
of
existing
systems
of
domination
automatically reduces the authority of anyone who wishes
to criticize the existing system from within.10 7 The dilemma
is that oppositional academics are "trying to destroy and
reconstitute an activity even while performing it. '10 s
As a result of the liar's paradox, Bourdieu urges
academics to do more than argue that the established order
is wrong; academics must also study and critique how
institutions reproduce the established order. 0 9 Silence, as
to the role that education plays in replicating this order,
supports objectification of these institutional processes and
contributes to their fertility. 1 0 The implication is that
educators must be willing to critique their own culture."'
The second paradox is a result of conflicts between a
person's conscious subjective view of herself and what
Bourdieu called the "objectivist" view of society's
hierarchical structures. 112 Bourdieu urges the observer to
look at the objective structures of domination but also at
the "consciousness and interpretations of agents [that] are
an essential component of the full reality of the social
world." 113 When a conflict occurs, the dichotomous view that
submission is always bad and resistance is always good

105. See Wacquant, supra note 9, at 7-9.
106. See BOURDIEU & PASSERON, supra note 6, at 12.
107. See id.
108. Robert Con Davis, A Manifesto for Oppositional Pedagogy: Freire,
Bourdieu, Merod and Graff, in REORIENTATIONS: CRITICAL THEORIES AND
PEDAGOGIES 249 (Bruce Henricksen & Thais E. Morgan eds., 1990).
109. See BOURDIEU, supra note 4, at 188-89.
110. See id.
111. See Weininger, supra note 15, at 117-18. Bourdieu argued that
sociologists must be willing to critique their own culture. Id. The same idea can
be applied to educators.
112. See Wacquant, supra note 9, at 7-9.
113. Id. at 9.
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does not always make social sense. For instance, resistance
can be alienating if the person must proclaim "the very
properties that mark [him] as dominated." 114 On the other
hand, submission can be empowering, such as when an
actor works hard to obscure her class origins to obtain the
economic and symbolic rewards available to those with a
higher status. 115 This contradiction between submission
and domination is, according to Bourdieu, an "'unresolvable
contradiction' 16 inscribed in the very logic of symbolic
domination."'
II. BOURDIEU'S THEORIES APPLIED TO LEGAL EDUCATION
This part of the Essay explains how Bourdieu's theories
might be applied to legal education, from a structural and
cultural standpoint. The first section looks at how legal
education's ranking and evaluation systems, based on
concepts of merit, reproduce the social structure of the legal
profession and help reinforce an important theme within
the culture of the law itself, a theme that enables continued
acceptance of the way our legal system operates. The second
section looks at how law schools replicate the image of the
legal profession as an upper-class culture and the ways in
which these cultural expectations affect students.
A. Reproduction of Class Differences Through Tiered
Rankings, Examinations, and the Myth of Merit
Similar to the French educational institutions that
Bourdieu studied, 117 American legal education replicates
existing class structures by assigning each law school to a
tier; ranking students within a law school; and utilizing the
bar examination as a gate-keeping mechanism for entry
into the profession. These classification methods and entry
barriers replicate existing group relations because they
advantage persons who already possess cultural or
economic capital and disadvantage those who do not.
Specifically, persons who do not possess much cultural or
114. Id. at 23.
115. See id. at 23-24.
116. Id. at 24 (citation omitted).
117. See BOURDIEU & PASSERON, supranote 6, at 165.

1174

BUFFALO LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 56

economic capital are more likely to end up at low-status
schools, have a low-class rank, or fail the bar exam, thereby
receiving less economic value for their law degree (or no law
degree at all). On the other hand, persons who have access
to cultural capital, in the form, for instance, of a highquality secondary education and family support for
educational pursuits, will be in a better position to obtain
admittance to a higher ranking institution.
In fact, a look at the history of American legal
education reveals that class exclusion was the explicit goal
behind the adoption of many of these ranking procedures.
Although law schools and the legal profession no longer
practice exclusion based on social origin, recent studies
indicate that the structure wrought by our recent history
remains-socio-economic status still plays a substantial
role in the structure of legal education and the legal
profession. Recent studies of the legal profession support
the following premises. First, the types of law practice that
law graduates will enter into are given varying levels of
prestige, from high-level corporate work at large law firms
to low-level work representing individual clients in a solo
practice setting. Second, the law school attended and how
well a graduate did at that law school has a bearing on the
status level of the legal work a law graduate will end up
doing. Third, students who come to legal education with
amassed cultural and social capital are more likely to
attend better law schools and achieve higher grades in law
school than students who lack the same amount of cultural
and social capital. Thus, the level of status and prestige
that one can attain in the practice of law is related to law
school status and law school performance, which are, in
turn, related to cultural capital advantages. As I will
explain in the last piece of this section, 118 these differential
outcomes, combined with market-forces, have recently led
to the creation of what can only be described as an
underclass of American attorneys-with no autonomy, no
contact with clients, and no job security.
Although socio-economic factors have a major bearing
on a student's status and place within the legal profession,
these context-based inequalities are not reflected in the
dominant discourse. Instead, the place where a student

118. See infra Part VI.
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ends up in the legal profession is represented in terms of
merit, supported by "objective" test-score entrance
requirements and examination-based ranking systems.
Thus, the myth of merit encourages law students to
mentally internalize the institution's structures without
questioning their arbitrary nature. Perhaps more
insidiously, the myth of merit mirrors and reinforces the
way that our common law tradition uses themes of equality
and objectivity to foster the idea that social outcomes are
the fair result of neutral processes rather than the result of
pre-existing inequalities. 119 In this way, a habitus is formed
that, when it is fully ingrained, causes unquestioning
acceptance of the legal profession's structure as well as the
role that the law continues to play in resolving our moral
and social problems.
1. The Historical Evolution of Class-Based Hierarchy
Within Legal Education and the Law Profession. The major
historians who have studied American legal education
agree that, in the nineteeth and twentieth centuries, elite
lawyers created a hierarchical structure within legal
education that had the effect of excluding "the great
'unwashed' masses" from educational institutions as well as
the bar. 120 A brief summary of nineteeth century legal
history might be helpful at this point. During the first half
of the nineteeth century, entry into the profession was
relatively informal; in line with the ideals of Jacksonian
Democracy, Abraham Lincoln exemplified the ability of the
everyman to practice law after spending time "reading
119. See ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO
"THINK LIKE A LAWYER" 4-6, 212-14 (2007) (explaining the process by which the
law employs abstract and formalistic legal reasoning, which emphasizes
procedure and precedent, at the expense of social context and moral issues);
supra notes 4-20 and accompanying text (explaining Bourdieu's theory of how
the law emphasizes neutrality and objectivity in order to instill public faith in
the system, a process that tends to obscure how legal outcomes often favor
dominant groups).
120. ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS OF LAW AT
HARVARD AND BEYOND 26-27 (1992). See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL
JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 102-24 (1976). While

Robert Stevens takes a more measured approach to legal education history than
Auerbach's indignant view, both authors agree that xenophobia and class-based
fear played a large role in these exclusionary practices. See also RANDALL
COLLINS, THE CREDENTIAL SOCIETY: AN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION
AND STRATIFICATION 148-59 (1979); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s 99-101 (1983).
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law. ' 121 As the power of Jacksonian Democracy faded, legal
education moved toward a more structured university
affiliated model (although it would not be until the next
century that all legal education was centered in a formal
setting).122 The new university law schools marketed
themselves as institutions that were uniquely situated to
teach America's gentry. 123 They tried hard not to admit
immigrants, Jewish applicants, African Americans, women,
or any other applicants who did not come from white, male,
124
Anglo stock.
As an alternative to the exclusionary university law,
the first part-time law schools were established in the
1860s to provide a legal education to working students and
immigrant students. 125 As immigration increased within
American cities, more part-time schools sprang up. 26 With
lax admission policies, these part-time and night schools
provided working students with legal educational
opportunities and a means for social advancement. 127
Most part-time law school graduates took jobs as solo
practitioners, in part because the newly emerging "white-

121. See COLLINS, supra note 120, at 149-50. A slight exception to this rule
would be the appearance of a few elite proprietary law schools during this
period, such as the Litchfield School. See STEVENS, supra note 120, at 3, 23.
122. See STEVENS, supra note 120, at 20.

123. The University of Georgia, in announcing the establishment of a law
school marketed themselves as follows:
[I]t is not those only who intend to devote themselves to the law, that
we invite to attend our school. There is in our State a large number of
young men who intend to devote themselves to the honorable
employment of cultivating the estates they inherit from their fathers.
To them a knowledge of the general principles of law is of inestimable
value.
Id. at 21 (quoting Announcement, Univ. of Ga. Law Dep't. (June 1, 1859)).
124. For instance, at a Yale faculty meeting in 1923, it was proposed that
the school not use grades as a basis for admission because doing so would allow
admission of foreign students rather than students of "old American" stock. Id.
at 101.
125. See id. at 74.
126. See COLLINS, supra note 120, at 155; GRANFIELD, supra note 120, at 33;
STEVENS, supra note 120, at 75.
127. See AUERBACH, supra note 120, at 88; STEVENS, supra note 120, at 75;
JOSEPH T. TINNELLY, PART-TIME LEGAL EDUCATION 5, 12 (1957).
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shoe" 128 corporate law firm adhered to strict hiring policies
that excluded graduates from low-status schools (defined, at
the time, as any school that was not Harvard, Yale, or
Columbia). 129 The result was that graduates of the lowstatus schools, for the most part, went into practice as solo
practitioners, while graduates from the elite universitycentered law schools practiced law at the nation's emerging
corporate law firms. 130 Elite attorneys, believing that the
influx of immigrant and ethnic attorneys threatened the
status of the legal profession, characterized the night-school
trained solo practitioners as corrupt shysters with no
professional standards or discretion. 131 Personal injury
lawyers, in particular, were maligned for not being able to
128. The adjective "white shoe" derives from the "white buck shoes that
were a fashion requirement within elite social organizations in the 1950s."
Investopedia Dictionary, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/whiteshoe.asp
(last visited Oct. 11, 2008).
Historically, the term "white-shoe" conveyed class envy and a gentle
ridicule of the educated effete. The wealthy could afford special shoes
for boating, tennis, and other genteel pursuits, and in the summer they
wore white bucks-perhaps with a bow tie and a seersucker suit-to
the exclusive Wall Street firms where they worked.
Elizabeth Chambliss, The Shoe Still Fits: The White Buck Is Gone From Elite
Law Firms,But The Snobbery It Represented Lives On, 4 LEGAL AFF. 18 (2005).
129. See AUERBACH, supra note 120, at 24, 26-27. Apparently, John Foster
Dulles was rejected from a job at Sullivan & Cromwell because his law degree,
from George Washington University, was not acceptable. Id. at 25-26. Even a
successful Jewish graduate of Harvard or Columbia would not be accepted as an
associate at the emerging white shoe firms, which refused to hire non-WASP
graduates of the elite schools. Id. at 25-27.
130. See id. at 5, 62; STEVENS, supra note 120, at 92.
131. See AUERBACH, supra note 120, at 41-42; TINNELLY, supra note 127, at
12. In her historical accounts of class issues within turn of the century legal
institutions, Susan Carle described a few of the "ethical" complaints leveled
against immigrant and working class attorneys. Susan D. Carle, Lawyers' Duty
to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of the 1908 Canons, 24 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 1, 8 (1999) [hereinafter Carle, Justice] (quoting an ABA committee
report which bemoaned "the shyster, the barratrously inclined, the ambulance
chaser, the member of the Bar with a system of runners, [who] pursue their
nefarious methods with no check save the rope of sand of moral suasion");
Susan D. Carle, How Should We Theorize Class Interests in Thinking About
Professional Regulation?: The Early NAACP as a Case Example, 12 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POLe/ 571, 584 (2004) [hereinafter Carle, Class Interests]. Here

Carle quotes one ethicist who stated that "the ambitious and intellectual
capacity of Oriental immigrants, with no apparent conception of English or
Teutonic ideals." Id. (quoting Charles A. Boston, A Code of Legal Ethics, in 20
THE GREEN BAG 224, 228 (Sydney R. Wrightington ed., 1908)).
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"speak the King's English correctly," leading to the
conclusion that "[t]hese men by character, by background,
by environment, by education were unfitted to be
lawyers.' 1 32 Lawyers who accepted criminal defense work
were similarly disparaged. 133 A common theme in the
attack on low-status lawyers was that they were corrupted
by the pursuit of legal fees. 134 Lawyers should not, thought
the elite lawyers of the day, actively solicit clients. 135
Rather, they should await clients "[1]ike young maidens
awaiting suitors." 136 Implied in the dichotomy between the
corrupt ambulance chasing attorney and the virtuous
passive attorney was the Aristotlean idea that only lawyers
of pre-existing wealth and means are in a position to
maintain the dignity of the profession. 37
At the beginning of the nineteeth century, as ethnic
immigrant attorneys gained more power, many in
conjunction with Irish-Catholic political machines in urban
areas, white Anglo-Saxon protestant attorneys, fueled by
132. AUERBACH, supra note 120, at 48-49 (citing Isidor J. Kresel, Ambulance
Chasing, Its Evils and Remedies Therefor, in 52 NEW YORK STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING 323, 337
(1929)). This concern over fitness for the practice of law ultimately led to the
creation of character and fitness requirements for state bar applicants. See id.
The character examination would "eliminate those who lacked proper
antecedents, home environment, education, and social contacts." Id. at 49.
133. See id. at 26.
134. See id. at 48-49. A leading lawyer characterized the contingency fee
system as "the great blot on the history of the American bar" because the lure of
money encouraged "undesirable persons" to enter the profession. Id. at 48
(quoting REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 86 (1919)).
135. See id. at 41.
136. Id.
137. See id. The ideal of the passive, virtuous attorney was ultimately
canonized in the ABA's Code of Professional Conduct, which outlawed attorney
advertising and direct solicitation of clients. Id. at 42-43. Susan Carle has
written a detailed historical account that seeks to reconcile class issues with the
adoption of the first Code of Professional conduct, in 1908. See, e.g., Carle,
Justice, supra note 131. Carle studied the issue again, in her study of class
issues within the NAACP. See Carle, Class Interests, supra note 131, at 575-76.
Professor Carle agrees, in part, with Auerbach's position that elite attorneys
drafted the Code of Professional Conduct in response to nativist fears and in an
effort to maintain their class privileges. See id. at 584-85. But ultimately, she
points to historical documents showing that the debates surrounding the Code
of Professional Responsibility were more nuanced and full-bodied than the
overarching class theory that Auerbach posited. See id. at 584-90.
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nativist class fears and xenophobia, worked to create
exclusionary educational policies to combat the threat of the
corrupt immigrant attorney. 138 Elite members of the
profession charged that the night schools, with their low
admissions requirements (many did not require any college
coursework) and lecture instruction methods, were
"unqualified" to prepare students for the practice of law. 139
Other critics mounted professionalism attacks on the
practice-oriented schools, arguing that the night schools
140
were failing to produce socially responsible attorneys.
Thus, the part-time and "night" schools began receiving the
derogatory remark of being nothing more than "trade
schools," incapable of141instilling any professional ideals into
their student bodies.
Concern over legal education standards grew until the
point where members of the American Bar Association
(ABA) and the American Association of Law Schools (AALS)
mobilized to raise standards and institutionalize those

138. See COLLINS, supranote 120, at 152-53; STEVENS, supra note 120, at 92103. The project of raising education standards for admission to the bar was
carried out in part by the nation's first local bar associations, which were
country-club like social organizations, formed for the purpose for drawing
together the best elements of the profession. See AUERBACH, supra note 120, at
62-63. The American Bar Association was founded with the same ideals in
mind. ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, LAW AND LAWYERS IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (1965)
("[The ABA's] objectives were chiefly social, and it was a rather exclusive
organization, open only to those who were regarded as leaders of the bar in
their communities."). See also Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism As Class
Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 657, 669-70
(1997).
139. See AUERBACH, supra note 120, at 97-101; COLLINS, supra note 120, at
155; TINNELLY, supra note 127, at 8-11.

140. See AUERBACH, supra note 120, at 99-101. Auberbach points out that
the professionalism arguments of this time period were thinly veiled antisemitic and nativist rants. Id. at 99.
141. See STEVENS, supra note 120, at 113, 114-15 (quoting JOSEF REDLICH,
THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS
70 (1914)). Another force in the conflict between the night schools and the
university schools was the role that relatively new university law professors
played to establish their professional identity and control within the education
marketplace. See generally John Henry Schlegel, Between the Harvard

Founders and the American Legal Realists: The Professionalization of the
American Law Professor, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311 (1985). Joining forces with the
ABA and AALS to advocate for higher standards was a way for Langdellian
university law professors to drive out the practitioner professor incumbents. See
id. at 321-22.
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heightened standards through state bar examiners. In the
1920s, the ABA, together with the AALS, created a body of
accreditation requirements that excluded many of the parttime schools with admissions requirements and curricular
offerings deemed too lax. 142 In turn, state bar examiners
began requiring a diploma from a school accredited by the
American Bar Association, in order to sit for that state's bar
examination.143 Whether attributable to these higher
standards or the financial effects of the depression, during
44
the 1930s, many low-status schools went out of business.
The history of American education in the late nineteeth
and early twentieth century illustrates how classist and
xenophobic forces helped mold the shape of modern legal
education. Fast-forwarding to contemporary American legal
education, we see that class-based elitism remains within
the structure of legal education, but it is now cloaked in
terms of objective merit and individual ability. Now that we
no longer have country-club lawyers keeping the gates of
our legal institutions locked from within, the idea of 145
a
meritocracy has become more difficult to criticize.
Although it is tempting to celebrate the fact that elite
American law schools have gotten rid of overt ethnic bias
and will open their doors to anyone with a high enough
LSAT score, studies support the idea that the law school
meritocracy is still a myth. Professional divisions are still
being produced, although they are now based on preexisting socio-economic
differences instead of racial or
146
ethnic differences.
142. See STEVENS, supra note 120, at 115; Warren A. Seavey, The
Association of American Law Schools in Retrospect. . 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 153,
153-67 (1950).
143. See Seavey, supra note 142, at 162-63, 166-67.
144. See STEVENS, supranote 120, at 177-78.
145. See, e.g., David Brooks, Bobos in Paradise, in SOCIAL STRATIFICATION:
CLASS, RACE, AND GENDER IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 304-10 (David B.

Grusky ed., 2007) (celebrating the changes in the New York Times Weddings
and Celebrations pages from the 1950s to the present, wherein coverage moved
from limited reports of WASP weddings to more diverse coverage of highly
credentialed nuptials).
146. There is a strong relationship, of course, to socio-economic
disadvantage and race. Years of violence and apartheid have created severe
socio-economic disadvantages that obstruct the ability of many poor African
Americans to succeed in the education game. See, e.g., William Julius Wilson,
The Sources of Poverty and the Underclass, in SOCIAL STRATIFICATION, supra

2008]

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

1181

2. The Rankings System in Contemporary Legal
Education. Accreditation accomplished the ABA and AALS'
goal of driving out the least desirable law schools, but
historical de facto stratification within legal education
remains intact. Contemporary American law schools are
striated into a tiered continuum, with elite schools at the
top and low-status schools at the bottom. 147 An informal
hierarchical ranking system has been in place as far back
as 1870, when Harvard Law School's president declared
that he would make Harvard the best law school by making
it the "longest and toughest."'148 John Henry Schlegel
uncovered a proto law school rankings system within the
West publication, the American Law School Review, as
early as 1902.149 Since 1990, the U.S. News and World
Report has made the structure of American legal education
publicly available in print and online. 150 The magazine
places law schools into four tiers, with the most elite schools
at the top and the low-status, "local" law schools filling the
note 145, at 340-49; Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, American
Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass, in SOCIAL
STRATIFICATION, supra note 145, at 349-59. The segregation and discrimination
continues to occur, but dominators express their discriminatory intent in terms
of class, not race. See Wilson, supra, at 346-47. For instance, in one study,
employers (both black and white) expressed negative feelings about employing
inner-city blacks because of perceptions that the applicants would not have
proper language skills. See id. One of the major problems of a class analysis
that does not account for race is that a color-blind class analysis ignores inquiry
into the violent, discriminatory roots of class disadvantage. Because it is not
illegal to discriminate against someone based on their class, blame is diffused.
Moreover, if intentional discrimination or segregation is still occurring, it is
easily masked in terms of class rather than color.
147. See GRANFIELD, supra note 120, at 123; PHILLIP C. KISSAM, THE
DISCIPLINE OF LAw SCHOOLS 19-23 (2003).
148. Richard Buckingham et al., Law School Rankings, Faculty Scholarship,
and Associate Deans for Faculty Research 7 (Suffolk Univ. Law Sch. Research
Paper,
Working
Paper
No.
07-23,
2007),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/absract=965032 (citing Paul D. Carrington, On Ranking: A
Response to Mitchell Berger, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 301, 301 (2003)).
149. Schlegel, supra note 141, at 319 (finding that a review of the faculty
announcements in that publication reveals a "nascent pecking order" where
provincial state law schools-Montana and North Dakota-were at the bottom
and Chicago, Michigan, Columbia, and Harvard were at the top).

150. See David C. Yamada, Same Old, Same Old: Law School Rankings and
the Affirmation of Hierarchy, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 249, 251-56 (1997).
Although there are other law school rankings systems, the most prominent is
the ranking system conducted by the U.S. News and World Report. Id. at 251.
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bottom tiers. 151 Large law firms accept the U.S. News and
World Report as credible authority and make hiring
decisions based on it.152 By basing the rankings on factors
that already support a school's elite status (LSAT scores,
career placement, reputation), schools who have long held
elite status (e.g. Harvard, Yale, University of Pennsylvania,
University of Chicago, Stanford) 153 are guaranteed to
appear within the top of this ranking system. Indeed, the
list of top law schools that appear every year in the U.S.
News and World Report do not differ, in great part,54 from
those schools that were considered elite in the 1920s.1
By using LSAT scores and undergraduate grades as
ranking factors, the U.S. News and World Report rewards
elite law schools for their self-perpetuating admissions
policies while access law schools, committed to providing a
legal education to the underserved, are forever consigned to
the bottom tiers. 155 The historic disdain for practiceoriented schools 156 also continues. The U.S. News and
World Report rankings reward schools that develop a
reputation for research and scholarship and devalue schools
that emphasize teaching and practice skills. 157 Many

151. See Law Rankings, 2008 EDITION: AMERICA'S BEST GRADUATE SCHOOLS:
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT 44, 44-47 (2007).
152. See Jonakait, supra note 3, at 876-77 (citing William D. Henderson &
Andrew P. Morriss, Student Quality as Measured by LSAT Scores: Migration

Patternsin the U.S. News Rankings Era, 81 IND. L.J. 183, 194 (2006)).
153. When a group of NYU professors were asked, in 1954, to list the toprated law schools in the country, they named: Harvard, Yale, Columbia,
Pennsylvania, Michigan, Stanford, California, Minnesota, Tulane, and Chicago.
Yamada, supra note 150, at 250.
154. See id.
155. See KISSAM, supra note 147, at 270.
156. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS 90 (2007)

(explaining that legal academia disincentivizes innovation in teaching because
it conflicts with factors [such as scholarship] that contribute to a law school's
standings and prestige); Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law by Design:
How Learning Theory and Instructional Design Can Inform and Reform Law
Teaching, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347, 360-61 & n.144 (2001) (citing Editorial,
How U.S. News Ranks GraduatePrograms,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Apr.

10, 2000, at 59). In his influential article on learning theory and legal
education, Schwartz explains: "[The] emphasis on scholarship derives from law
schools' aspirations for upward mobility within the law school hierarchy. Law
schools enhanced their prestige based, in significant part, on faculty
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curricula remain
schools with innovative practice-centered
158
at the bottom of the rankings.
The law school ranking system sets a process in motion
that perpetuates the historic stratification within the legal
profession. In terms of the way that the law school attended
determines one's law practice, little has changed from the
turn of the century when graduates from elite schools
handled mostly corporate clients and graduates of the
lower-rung schools handled personal clients.159 The
consensus among the scholars who study sociological trends
in legal education is that persons from disadvantaged
backgrounds are more likely to attend a low-tier school,
whereas graduates of elite schools are "overwhelmingly the
children of advantage." 160 Graduates from elite schools are
better able to secure high-paying, high-status jobs at large
law firms while, for the most part, graduates from lowstatus law schools enter practice making substantially less
and
small
clients
representing personal
money,

publications; teaching skill or effectiveness is not considered in the [U.S. News
and World Report] rankings." Id. at 360. See also Jon M. Garon, Take Back The
Night: Why An Association of Regional Law Schools Will Return Core Values To
Legal Education and Provide An Alternative To Tiered Rankings, 38 U. TOL. L.
REV. 517 (2007); Laurel Terry, Taking Kronman and Glendon One Step Further:
In Celebrationof "ProfessionalSchools," 100 DICK. L. REV. 647-48 (1996).
158. See Garon, supra note 157, at 523. See also Posting of Michael Dorf to
Dorf on Law, http://michaeldorf.org/2007/09/did-chemerinsky-dodge-bullet.html
(Sept. 16, 2007, 12:01 EST) ('The schools that have made [practical skills
training] central to their curriculum, e.g., CUNY, Northeastern, have had some
local success, but that has not translated into moving themselves [sic] schools
up in the pecking order or getting the innovations widely adopted.").
159. See STEVENS, supra note 120, at 92, 96; Jonakait, supra note 3, at 86465 (citing HEINZ ET AL., supra note 2). In line with historic trends, corporate law
firm work continues to carry a higher level of symbolic status and prestige,
whereas personal client representation continues to be marginalized. See HEINZ
ET AL., supra note 2, at 81-87 (explaining that the attorneys surveyed for the
studies ranked corporate work as having the highest prestige and personal
client representation as having the lowest prestige).
160. See DINOVITZER ET AL., supra note 2, at 20 ("The more selective the law
school, the more likely it is to educate the children of relative privilege, and the
less selective schools are notably more accessible to the less privileged
students."); HEINZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 50 ("[P]ersons with prestigious law
degrees . . .are more likely to have a privileged socioeconomic background, to
have been born into an upper-class or upper-middle-class family, and to have
useful social connections."); Dinovitzer & Garth, supranote 2, at 33-35.

1184

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

businesses. 161 While recent studies indicate that students
from less elite schools are having more success at finding
jobs at large law firms, 16 2 the data also suggests that the
students who do succeed in getting these jobs (whether from
urban law schools or elite law schools) have high socioeconomic indicators. 163 The trend appears to be that with
heightening law school admissions standards, more
students from advantaged backgrounds are attending lowstatus schools. 64 The night school tradition of providing a
legal education to working-class students appears to be
diminishing in strength. 65 In line with Bourdieu's theories,
having the connections that come from an advantaged
background seems to provide social capital that is helpful
for obtaining a high-paying job at a large law firm. 166
The After the JD data detailing the experiences of
students who graduated from low-status schools but who
have obtained large law firm jobs provides further support
that stratification, based on the rank of law school
attended, continues to exist. For instance, the statistics
161. With respect to how law school attended determines practice area, see
David Wilkins et al., Urban Law School Graduatesin Large Law Firms,36 Sw.
U. L. REV. 433, 497 (2007) ("Compared to elite graduates, urban graduates are
more likely to work as solo practitioners ... They are also much less likely to
work in large firms."). With respect to salary differentials, the median salaries
for recent graduates of third-tier and fourth-tier schools was $60,000 and
$56,341, respectively, whereas the median salary for graduates from a top ten
school was $135,000. Jonakait, supra note 3, at 878 (citing DINOVITZER ET AL.,
supra note 2). See also Joyce Sterling et al., The ChangingSocial Role of Urban
Law Schools, 36 Sw. U. L. REV. 389, 414 (2007) (explaining that data from the
After the JD study indicates that graduates from elite law schools make
substantially more money than graduates from non-elite schools).
162. Wilkins et al., supra note 161, at 444-45. Graduates of lesser status
schools are being hired by the large law firms, but law firms employ a "sliding
scale" for credentials. See id. at 454, 461. As the law school's status decreases,
the required academic and extra-curricular credentials (G.P.A., class rank, and
law review) increase. See id.
163. Id. at 502. See also Sterling et al., supranote 161, at 409-10.
164. Wilkins et al., supra note 161, at 458.
165. See id. at 404-05 ("In general, law schools are comprised of relatively
few individuals from highly disadvantaged backgrounds.").
166. See id. at 409-10. But see ZEMANS & ROSENBLUM, supra note 2, at 95
(finding a statistically significant relationship between the prestige of a law
school and a student's social background [measured by the occupation of the
father] but not finding a statistically significant relationship between an
attorney's social background and the prestige of her law practice and setting).
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show that even when graduates from low-status schools
succeed in obtaining a job at a large law firm, after two to
three years, these graduates are making substantially less
money than their more credentialed counterparts. 16 7 Within
the large firms, graduates from top schools are more likely
to perform high-prestige work that focuses on securities and
general corporate law, whereas graduates from lesser
schools will specialize in lower-status work such as personal
injury defense, family law, or general practice.168 Finally,
students from less elite schools also face a lesser probability
of making 169partner than associates with more elite
credentials.
3. Class Rank. Ranking students within a law school,
based on grades they receive through the case-book law
school examination system 70 also replicates pre-existing
structures. Class rank and a competitive selection process
for law review membership began in earnest in 1887, when
Harvard established its law review and selected members
based on their academic rank. 171 Most of the other
university-centered law schools followed Harvard's lead and
established their own student-edited law reviews that
invited members based on academic performance. 172 The
class rank system grew further when newly-emerging
corporate law firms began basing hiring decisions
on a
173
student's class rank and law review membership.

167. See Wilkins et al., supra note 161, at 497.
168. See id. at 492.
169. See id. at 482 (explaining that a graduate from a top law school has a
twenty-one percent chance of becoming partner at a large law firm, while a
graduate from a non-elite school has an eight percent chance). Another study
indicated that in a pool of large law firms, seventy percent of all partners
graduated from one of thirteen top schools. Id.
170. Similar to the LSAT, Charles Langdell's casebook method (of which the
law school exam is a product) also arose out of the desire to use objective
principles to "winnow[ ] out large numbers of students, allowing only the 'fittest'
and the most able (who also happened to be the most affluent and Anglo-Saxon)

to survive." Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructingthe Distinction Between Bias and
Merit, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1481 (1997) (citing STEVENS, supra note 120, at 55).
171. See AUERBACH, supra note 120, at 27.
172. See id. at 27, 30.
173. See id. at 27-28. While the newly emerging corporate law firms used
academic merit to make hiring decisions, the process was not a pure
meritocracy. Id. For the most part, academically talented black, Jewish, and
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The class rank system has not changed substantively
from its origins at Harvard in 1887.174 Class rank, based on
grades received on law school examinations, continues to
serve as the competitive selection process for membership
on law review, law school honors, and as a gate-keeping
mechanism for legal employers. 175 Legal employers use a
student's class rank to determine who they will interview
for positions, refusing to consider students who do not make
the strict cut-off point. 176 Moreover, even if a law firm elects
to interview students from lower-tiered schools (and many
will not), the class rank cut-off point for graduates at lowertiered schools is significantly lower than where it is for
graduates at more prestigious schools. 77 Thus, similar to
what occurs with the overall ranking of law schools, the
economic value of a178law degree will depend on the class
rank of the student.
The class ranking system favors students who have
amassed cultural and economic capital over others with less
capital. For instance, students who have gone to high
quality secondary and undergraduate schools are better
able to master exam taking skills than students who have
had less exposure, in secondary and undergraduate
education, to rigorous analysis and logic. 179 Or, students
female law school graduates were excluded from these law firms. Id. at 29-30.
174. While some of the more elite schools have abolished the class-rank
system, the lower-status schools continue to employ the system. See, e.g.,
Anthony Ciolli, The Legal Employment Market: Determinants of Elite Firm
Placement and How Law Schools Stack Up, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 413, 433 (2005)
(explaining that Yale and University of California-Berkeley follow an
honors/pass/fail system that does not utilize traditional class ranks).
175. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF
HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM 81 (2004); KISSAM, supra note 147,

at 52; Douglas A. Henderson, Uncivil Procedure:Ranking Law Students Among
Their Peers, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 399, 405-06 (1994) (quoting Steve H.
Nickles, Examining and Grading in American Law Schools, 30 ARK. L. REV.
411, 411-12 (1997)).
176. See KISSAM, supra note 147, at 52. See also John M. Conley, Tales of
Diversity: Lawyers' Narratives Of Racial Equity in Private Firms, 31 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 831, 841-42 (2006).

177. See David B. Wilkins, A Systematic Response to Systemic Disadvantage:
A Response To Sander, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1915, 1929 n.53 (2005).
178. See, e.g., KISSAM, supra note 147, at 52-53.
179. In her article "Boalt-ing"Opportunity?: DeconstructingElite Norms in
Law School Admissions, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 199, 217 (1999), Abiel
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who can afford to attend law school without having to work
will have advantages over students who must balance a job
and child-care responsibilities while studying law. 18 0 It does
not help that many law schools deemphasize factors that, if
afforded greater weight, might create broader opportunities
for academic distinction and merit. For instance, in many
law
schools,
coursework
that
emphasizes
more
contextualized forms of communication and analysis, such
as client counseling, alternative dispute resolution, trial
advocacy, and negotiation, are considered non-rigorous and
graded on a pass/fail/no-credit basis.181 The work done in
these classes does not affect a student's class rank. As
another example, there is no room in the class rank system
for a student to improve her class standing through "nonacademic" work such as community service or pro-bono
work. Some might argue that class rank outcomes are
genuinely merit-related-students with greater natural
talent and work ethics can be expected to perform better in
law school than students with less "merit." What this meritbased argument fails to account for, however, is that the
cultivation of talent and a work ethic requires the
Wong explains that when the casebook method was first introduced, students
with less formal educations were at a major disadvantage. Id. "Because the
case-method was completely removed from any real-life experience, lessadvantaged, self-taught individuals were placed at a substantial disadvantage
in law schools emphasizing abstract, hypothetical teaching, vis-A-vis wealthier
students with more formalized education." Id. Arguably, these disadvantages
continue to exist today, where there are major differences in the rigor and
quality of education opportunities in America. See also Richard Delgado,
Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit and Affirmative Action, 83 GEO. L.J. 1711,
1719, 1724-25 (1995) (arguing that merit-based academic success depends on
access to cultural and educational capital, which the objective criteria tend to
ignore).
180. See Pamela Edwards, The Culture of Success: Improving the Academic
Success Opportunities For Multicultural Students in Law School, 31 NEw ENG.
L. REV. 739, 750 (1996) (citing Linda F. Wightman, Women in Legal Education:
A Comparison of the Law School Performance and Law School Experiences of
Women and Men, LSAC RESEARCH REPORT SERIES (1996)). The evidence for this
thesis also exists anecdotally and by analogy to the experiences of students
studying for the bar exam. See, e.g., Kristin Booth Glen, Thinking Out of the
Bar Exam Box: A Proposal to "MacCrate"Entry to the Profession, 23 PACE L.
REV. 343, 495 n.657 (2003) [hereinafter Glen, Thinking Out of the Bar Exam
Box]; Kristin Booth Glen, When and Where We Enter: Rethinking Admission to
the Legal Profession, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1696, 1701 nn.13-14 (2002)
[hereinafter Glen, When and Where We Enter].
181. See Nancy H. Kaufman, A Survey of Law School Grading Practices,44
J. LEGAL EDUC. 415, 416 (1994).
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deployment of cultural capital, in the form, for instance, of
the knowledge and encouragement that a family transmits
to a student at home. 8 2 The reality of our narrowly defined
concept of law school merit is that it allows the advantaged
to use inherited capital to retain their elevated station and
place the disadvantaged
on a lower level, maintaining the
1 83
existing structure.
4. A New Lawyer Underclass? The tiers, ranks, and
differential levels of prestige, detailed above, have led to a
recent (and alarming) stratification trend within the legal
profession, one that is linked to both class rank and law
school prestige. In the past few years, large law firms have
begun employing temporary attorneys, at hourly rates with
no benefits, to perform low-level legal tasks, such as largescale document reviews and coding.184 The depressing
reports, keyed in by temporary attorney bloggers, read
more like an account of pre-Lochner era working conditions
than a professional, autonomous work environment. 8 5 The
anonymous temporary attorney bloggers tell stories of
spending long hours in front of computer screens reviewing
and coding documents in dreggy basement workspaces with
dead cockroaches on the floor, blocked exits, and
overflowing bathrooms. 8 6 Workers must obtain permission
182. See, e.g., Bourdieu, supra note 47, at 96, 98-99 (explaining within the
context of education the role that cultural capital plays in the cultivation of
talent and academic achievement).
183. See Bourdieu & Champagne, supranote 17, at 423-25.
184. See Amir Efrati, Hard Case: Job Market Wanes for U.S. Lawyers, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 24, 2007, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.comlpublidt
article-print/SB119040786780835602.html; Barbara Ehrenreich, CEOs vs. Slaves,
THE NATION, May 29, 2007, http://www.thenation.comldoc/20070611/ehrenreich.
185. See,
e.g.,
Black
Sheep
of
Philly
Contract
Attorneys,
http://blacksheepcontractatty.blogspot.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2008); My
Attorney Blog, The Life of a Contract Attorney in Temp Town, Washington
D.C., http://www.myattorneyblog.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2008); Temporary
Attorney: The Sweatshop Edition, http://temporaryattorney.blogspot.com (last
visited Oct. 11, 2008). See also Julie Triedman, Slaves of New York, THE AM.
LAW., Mar. 2006, at 19, 19. Workers must obtain permission to use the
bathroom and are not allowed to leave the premises to, for instance, walk
outside to get a cup of coffee, unless it is during the forty-five minute lunch time
allocation. See id. See also Posting of helpme123 to Temporary Attorney: The
Sweatshop Edition, http://temporaryattorney.blogspot.com (Jan. 28, 2008, 00:16
EST) [hereinafter Posting of helpme123] (detailing the work requirements for a
document review job at a major New York law firm).
186. See Posting of helpme123 to Temporary Attorney: The Sweatshop
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to use the bathroom and are not allowed to leave the
premises to, for instance, walk outside to get a cup of coffee,
unless it is during the forty-five minute lunch time
allocation. 187 Temporary attorneys do not do legal research,
they do not go to court, and do not ever meet with clients.18 8
The attorneys who take these temporary jobs graduated
from low-tier institutions and do not have the academic
credentials to acquire jobs as associates at the large law
firms. 189 With temporary attorneys, large law firms appear
to have created a new lawyer underclass that greatly
conflicts with the idea that attorneys are members of a
noble, autonomous profession. Moreover, the same profit
incentives that caused law firms to utilize temporary
attorneys are now leading law firms to embrace the benefits
of globalization and outsource low-level, routine legal work
to India, where the market rate for attorneys is $6,000 a
year-or $2 an hour.' 90 Although the broader subject of the
effects of late-capitalism and globalization on the legal
profession and professional identity is outside the scope of
this Essay, 191 the institutionalized hierarchical structures
within legal education are playing a role in these new
developments.
5. The Bar Examination. Because it functions as a
barrier to entry into the profession, the bar examination is
perhaps the strongest mechanism that tends to replicate
the pre-existing social makeup of the legal profession.
Edition, http://temporaryattorney.blogspot.com (July 14, 2008, 2:20 EST)
(describing the smell of overflowing bathrooms in the basement document
review workspace as that of "an open sewer"); Triedman, supra note 185, at 19
(describing temporary attorneys working twelve hour days in "windowless
basement room[s] littered with dead cockroaches" with "six or seven" blocked
exits).
187. See id. See also Posting of helpmel23, supranote 185.
188. See Arin Greenwood, Attorney at Blah, WASH. CITY PAPER, Nov. 19,
2007, available at http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/display.php?id=34054.
189. See id.; Efrati, supranote 184, at Al, All.
190. See Daniel Brook, Are Your Lawyers in New York or New Delhi, LEGAL

May/June
2005,
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issuesMay-June2005/scenebrook-mayjuno5.msp; Arin Greenwood, Inside India's Hottest Legal
AFF.,

Outsourcing Firm: Manhattan Work at Mumbai Prices, 93 A.B.A. L.J. 36, 40
(2007), http://abajournal.com/magazine/manhattanwork-at-mumbai_prices/.
191. For an in-depth look at globalization, outsourcing, and its effect on the
legal profession, see Jayanth K. Krishnan, Outsourcing and the Globalizing
Legal Profession, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2189 (2007).
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Although the bar examination is not conducted under the
auspices of a legal educational institution, its structure and
format mirror that of written law school exams. 192 The
currently accepted justification for the traditional bar
examination is that it screens out applicants who are not fit
for law practice. 193 The high-stakes pressurized format of
the bar examination is justified because "the life of the
lawyer is inevitably one of constant testing. ' 194 However,
like the status-based classification scheme of law schools,
the origins of the modern American bar examination also
has roots as an attempt by the upper-class to exclude
members of the lower classes. 195 As explained above, the
influx of immigrant and ethnic attorneys around the turn of
the century posed a great threat to the legal profession's
upper-class image and ideals. 196 Accordingly, the campaign
carried on by the ABA and the AALS to create a written
examination requirement for admission to practice law has
been characterized as "an effort to reassert traditionalistic
upper-class and WASP monopoly over legal practice. 1 97
Notwithstanding the exclusionary goals of the original
proponents of the bar examination, the bottom line is that
those who fail the examination are refused entry into the
profession and access to its economic benefits. The bar
examination operates as the ultimate status closure
mechanism 98 by limiting the supply of lawyers to ensure

192. See COLLINS, supra note 120, at 153-54.

193. See, e.g., Christian C. Day, Law Schools Can Solve the "Bar Pass
Problem"- "Do The Work!', 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 321, 335 (2004).
194. Erwin N. Griswold, In Praiseof Bar Examinations, 60 A.B.A. J. 81, 8283 (1974) (citing BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS
AND ADDRESSES 160-62 (1931)).
195. COLLINS, supra note 120, at 153-56.

196. See id. at 156.
197. Id. But see Daniel R. Hansen, Do We Need The Bar Examination? A
CriticalEvaluation of the JustificationsFor the Bar Examination and Proposed
Alternatives, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1191, 1200 (1995) (citing STEVENS, supra

note 120, at 21) (Hansen argues that the written bar examination arose to
replace oral examination procedures; there was no specific intent to exclude
students from less-elite law schools).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 80-86. In addition to the bar
examination, the evolution of modern fitness standards might also be seen as a
status closure mechanism designed to limit the supply of attorneys in order to
halt salary erosion.
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that the price of legal services remains elevated. 199 One
theory is that these economic concerns have been driving
recent efforts by states to enact higher bar passage
standards. 200 Although a common justification for
increasing bar passage standards has been that law school
graduates are of inferior quality than those in previous
generations, evidence showing an oversupply of attorneys in
the labor market gives credence to the status closure
theory. 201 Attempts to heighten bar passage standards
could be, in reality, an attempt to limit the number of
attorneys entering the job market in order to halt salary
erosion. 202
Another substantive problem with the bar examination
is that its structure is grounded in the older, white-shoe law
firm mentorship model which presupposes that the bar
examination does not need to test practice skills because
attorneys do not need real-life practice skills when they
begin work. Rather, lawyers can expect to receive skills
instruction on the job, through the mentoring and
instruction of the firm's senior associates and partners. 203
Thus, for the elite large law firms and the law school
graduates who will work for these firms, all that is
necessary to enter the profession is the ability to master the
structure and form of the test. 20 4 The bar examination does
not assess whether or not attorneys have the skills
necessary to succeed in a small firm or sole practice, where
199. See Kidder, supranote 80, at 548-49, 555. Class rank may also function
as a status closure device because it reserves access to the legal profession's
most valuable economic benefits-the exorbitant salaries paid by the elite law
firms-to those students who meet the rigid credential requirement of a high
class rank.
200. See id. at 547-63.
201. See id. at 552, 556-63.
202. See id. at 581-82. Regardless of the reasons for the higher standards,
Professor Kidder argues that those higher standards have a disparate impact
and create unfair results for bar applicants of color. Id. at 581-82.
203. See Jayne W. Barnard & Mark Greenspan, Incremental Bar Admission:
Lessons From the Medical Profession, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 340, 355 (2003)

(explaining that the understanding for law students was that licensure was
merely the first step toward professional competence; professional competence
came later, after training and mentoring from law firm partners and senior
associates bridged the gap between licensure and practice competence).
204. In recent years, the large law firms are allocating less resources and
time to mentoring young associate attorneys. See id.
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mentoring opportunities are limited. 205 There is also a
curricular effect-because the bar examination does not
assess practice skills, but rather, places value on abstract
knowledge of legal rules, practice
skills tend to be devalued
206
within law school curricula.
Persons who come from disadvantaged socio-economic
backgrounds have a more difficult time with the bar
examination than those who have access to more
educational and economic capital. 20 7 As is the case with law
school examinations, students who received quality
to8
secondary and undergraduate educations are more likely 20
have greater test-taking skills than those who did not.
Students who can afford to take commercial bar exam
preparation classes will have advantages over students who
cannot afford those classes. 20 9 Although there are no
existing empirical studies that correlate a bar applicant's
individual economic and social situation (amount of debt,
205. See, e.g., A.B.A., LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENTAN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND
THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 277-78 (1992) [hereinafter The MacCrate

Report] (explaining that the traditional bar examination does not assess many
of the fundamental lawyering skills necessary for the successful practice of law);
Barnard & Greenspan, supra note 203, at 354-55 (arguing that although
licensure suggests that new lawyers are fit to open an office and begin
practicing law, the reality is that solo and small-firm lawyers are ill-equipped to
handle that responsibility).
206. See The MacCrate Report, supra note 205, at 278 ("[T]he examination
influences law schools, in developing their curricula, to overemphasize courses
in the substantive areas covered by the examination at the expense of courses
in the area of lawyering skills."). See also infra Part VI (discussing how law
teachers are often constrained to present the law conservatively, in a form that
will be rewarded by the bar examiners).
207. See Glen, When and Where We Enter, supra note 180, at 1701 nn.13-14
(citing LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, LSAC NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL BAR PASSAGE STUDY
37-38 (LSAC Research Rep. Series 1998)); Hansen, supra note 197, at 1206
(positing that bar passage rates correlate to LSAT scores).
208. In fact, this is the position of the National Council of Bar Examiners
(NCBE) in explaining disparities in bar performance between white and ethnic
applicants. See also STEPHEN P. KLEIN, SUMMARY OF RESEARCH ON THE
MULTISTATE BAR EXAMINATION 38 (GANSK 1993); Kidder, supra note 80, at 565
(citing Stephen P. Klein, Bar Examinations:Ignoring the Thermometer Does Not
Change the Temperature, N.Y. St. B.J. 28-33 (Oct. 1989)). Professor Kidder's
view is that the NCBE has overly de-emphasized the disparate impact that the
bar examination has had on persons of color.
209. See Glen, Thinking Out of the Bar Exam Box, supra note 180, at 494;
Glen, When and Where We Enter, supranote 180, at 1704.
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hours
worked for
income
per
week,
child-care
responsibilities)
with
performance
on
the
bar
examination, 210 anecdotal evidence suggests that students
who must work and/or shoulder child-care responsibilities
while also studying for the bar are materially
disadvantaged in terms of bar exam success. 211 Because
persons with fewer economic and educational resources
have less of a chance of succeeding on the bar examination
than those with more, the bar examination favors entry for
the
advantaged,
thereby
replicating
pre-existing
hierarchical structures. 212
6.The Myth of Merit. The success of an American law
student-gaining admission to a highly ranked school,
obtaining a high class rank, and passing the bar exam-is
largely defined in terms of merit, which obscures the
arbitrary ways in which professional status is awarded. By
defining success in law school and in the profession in
terms of merit and ability, the legal profession hides the
210. See Glen, Thinking Out of the Bar Exam Box, supra note 180, at 494.
211. See id. at 495 n.57
(At CUNY, we have often surmised that paying for the bar review
course . . . and supplying childcare and similar substitutes for our

graduates' familial work and community responsibilities would be the
most effective strategy for raising bar pass rates. Our own lack of
resources has, however, made this hypothesis impossible to test.);
Glen, When and Where We Enter, supra note 180, at 1703-04 (explaining
anecdotal evidence that graduates of CUNY Law School who must work fulltime, take care of children, and study for the bar may have a higher likelihood
of failing the bar exam than students who have no child-care responsibilities
and are able to study full-time for the bar exam).
212. In describing the exclusionary history and effect of the bar
examination, I am not proposing here that states should eradicate the bar
examination altogether. Rather, my hope would be that state admissions
authorities would embrace alternative methods of evaluation, which take a
more holistic approach and which genuinely seek to measure and assess an
applicant's ability to practice law, as it is actually practiced and experienced.
See, e.g., Barnard & Greenspan, supra note 203, at 355 (proposing a bar
admissions process, focusing on practice and doctrine, that would be
administered in pieces, throughout law school); Kristin Booth Glen, In Defense
of the PSABE, and Other 'Alternative" Thoughts, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1029,
1031 (2004) (proposing a Public Service Bar Alternative Exam that would be a
"true performance test" where applicants would have to demonstrate minimum
competence in core lawyering skills over a ten to twelve week period of time);
Hansen, supra note 197, at 1231-35 (proposing bar admission requirements that
would include an "intensive supervised research project" and a mandatory
clerkship).
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fact that, in many instances, the privileged are the ones
213
who benefit the most from the legal educational system.
In Bourdieusian terms, the myth of merit 214 creates a
habitus that causes law students to internally arrive at
individual expectations and goals based on the legal
profession's existing hierarchy. 215 Through this process of
objectification, 216 students come to believe that status
within the law profession is not arbitrary, but is instead
based on principles of individual merit and intelligence. By
focusing on these ranking mechanisms alone, proponents of
the system see legal education as a democratic meritocracy;
they do not see the social barriers that affect the award of
status.21 7 The myth of merit excludes the possibility that a
poor performance might result from a dearth of social and
economic capital, in the form, for instance, of an ability to
live in districts with better kindergarten, elementary, and
secondary schools 218 ; to pay for Kaplan/Princeton Review

213. See BOURDIEU & PASSERON, supra note 6, at 167.
214. The myth of merit, as it appears in educational institutions, originated
in the work of Max Weber. See MAX WEBER, 2 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 998-1001
(Univ. Cal. Press 1978).
215. See Wacquant, supra note 9, at 18 & n.33.
216. See BOURDIEU, supra note 4, at 164-65.
217. For instance, reminiscing about his days at Harvard Law School
between 1903-1906, Felix Frankfurter celebrated Harvard's "democratic" classblind and color-blind academic ranking system, without taking into account
that at the time, Harvard's admissions requirement of a college degree barred
ninety-six percent of the American population from the chance to excel
academically. See AUERBACH, supra note 120, at 28-29 (citing FELIX
FRANKFURTER, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 26-27 (Reynal & Co. 1960)).
Frankfurter also glossed over the fact that even if a Jewish student (like
himself) excelled academically, the chances were slim that the student would be
able to use his credentials to get in the door at most Wall Street law firms,
which refused to hire Jews. See id. Although law schools no longer make
exclusionary admissions decisions based on race, sex, or class, modern law
school admissions criteria and ranking mechanisms have the same limiting
effect.
218. There is empirical evidence that applicants from lower socio-economic
backgrounds do not score as well on the LSAT as applicants from higher socioeconomic backgrounds. See Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in
Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning
Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 42-43
(1997). Professor Wightman posits that the difference in performance might be
related to "differences in educational opportunity." Id. at 42.
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LSAT tutoring 219 ; or to benefit from the knowledge of family
members who can help guide a student through the
220
educational system.
The myth of merit also causes advantaged law students
to believe that their success is based on their individual
merit, gaining the "supreme privilege of not seeing
themselves as privileged. ' 221 On the other hand,
disadvantaged students see their failure in terms of their
"lack of gifts or merits, because in matters of culture[,]
absolute dispossession excludes awareness of being
dispossessed. '222 Thus, American legal education, with its
emphasis on symbolic prestige and merit, enables the
privileged classes "to appear to be surrendering to a
perfectly neutral authority the power of transmitting power
from one generation to another, and thus to be renouncing
the arbitrary privilege of the hereditary transmission of
privileges. '223 Students learn to expect and accept, as a
matter of course and without any kind of fight, their
assigned station in the profession. 224 Thus, within the legal
profession,
this
un-coerced
participation
in
the
subordination process enables the efficient replication of the
existing structure for future generations.225
It would be quite an overstatement to argue that legal
education's replication of existing inequalities within the
legal profession is one of the more unjust instances of social
stratification in American society. The legal profession,
despite its ingrained hierarchy, does afford all of its
members a certain amount of professional prestige and the
economic benefits of having a middle-class/upper-class

219. See Kirsten Edwards, Found! The Lost Lawyer, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 37,
45 (2001) (enumerating the socio-economic factors that correlate with academic
achievement in high school and college, which lead to acceptance at an elite law
school); Wong, supra note 179, at 232-33 (positing that higher LSAT scores can
be had by those who can afford to pay for commercial LSAT preparation
courses).
220. See BoURDIEU & PASSERON, supra note 6, at 172-173 n.22; Bourdieu &
Champagne, supranote 17, at 424.
221. See BOURDIEU & PASSERON, supra note 6, at 210.
222. See id.; Bourdieu & Champagne, supranote 17, at 421.
223. BOURDIEU & PASSERON, supra note 6, at 167.
224. See BOURDIEU, supra note 4, at 192.
225. See id.
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income. However, the way that our legal educational
institutions reproduce the structure of the legal profession
is a micro-example of the way that our legal educational
institutions, in general, engender deeply ingrained beliefs
about the fairness and neutrality of our legal systems and
discourage inquiries into the underlying inequalities and
injustices operating beneath the structural foundation of
the law. Elizabeth Mertz's recent book, The Language of
Law School: Learning to "Think Like a Lawyer" provides
ample evidence of this process at work in the law school
226
classroom.
Professor Mertz's study shows that when students learn
to "think like a lawyer" they are acquiring, in Bourdiesian
terms, a powerful habitus that works collectively to achieve
outcomes using abstract, "objective" notions of procedure
and precedent, which tend to make social and moral
contextual factors invisible or, in the language of legal
analysis, irrelevant. 227 Moreover, the process by which
certain meanings become dominant is invisible, because 228
of
the ostensible neutrality that the legal language affords.
Legal education's role in recreating the striations within
the legal profession is but one example of such a hidden
process at work. Beyond the unfairness that results from
our multi-tiered legal education system, the analogy
between legal education's role in replicating the existing
structure of the legal profession and the law's power, in
general, to propel acceptance in legal outcomes that229
favor
the privileged makes this problem worth pointing out.
226. See MERTZ, supra note 119. Professor Mertz's book contains the results
of a linguistic study on the socializing effect of legal language. A central theme
that emerges from Professor Mertz's study is that the common law method of
legal analysis used in the United States, which students learn in law school,
requires mastery of a core legal language. Id. at 4. When used to solve legal
problems, this core language privileges technical form and levels of legal
authority over social contexts and moral issues. Id. at 4-6, 212-14. The core
legal language taught at American law schools also tends to situate legal actors
equally and erase and ignore social differences. Id. Although the dominant
method of legal analysis has been used to achieve liberating results (such as the
case with the 1950s and 1960s Civil Rights litigations), it also causes some
viewpoints to become invisible and others to dominate. Id. at 212-14.
227. See id. at 4-6, 212-14.
228. Id. at 5.
229. Pointing out the problem is in line with Bourdieu's belief that
academics should critique and study the educational institutions they are a part
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B. The Exhibition of Taste and Distinction
In addition to its ranking systems and merit ideology,
law schools replicate the imagery of the law profession as
an upper-class culture by teaching students to adopt upperclass "professional" mannerisms and behaviors. 230 The
American legal profession has long been viewed 231
as
occupying the cultural and social space of the aristocracy.
The prestige of the legal profession is advanced, in part,
through the outward display of symbolic goods and
manners, which create aurae of taste, distinction, and high
culture. 23 2 The display of symbolic goods (in the form of
tasteful, conservative clothing) and the performative
aspects of professional manners (speaking with proper
restraint and diction)233
promotes the legal profession as a
noble, elite profession.
The culture of the law values upper-class styles and
manners. 234 From a common sense perspective, the legal
profession's obsession with upper-class culture can be
explained in terms of self-serving notions of statuslawyers certainly like to view themselves as members of a
of in order to uncover and demystify the invisible ways that our institutions
operate to maintain the structures of our society. See, e.g., Wacquant, supra
note 9, at 14; Weininger, supra note 15, at 117-18.
230. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 175, at 54. See also GRANFIELD, supra
note 120, at 109-142; Mary O'Brien & Sheila McIntyre, PatriarchalHegemony
and Legal Education, 2 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 69, 79 (1986).

231. The famous De Tocqueville quote speaks for itself:
In America there are no nobles or literary men, and the people are apt
to mistrust the wealthy; lawyers consequently form the highest
political class and the most cultivated portion of society ....
If I were
asked where I place the American aristocracy, I should reply without
hesitation that it is not among the rich, who are united by no common
tie, but that it occupies the judicial bench and the bar.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 288 (1954).

232. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
233. The analogy here is to the concept that groups reinforce their image
displaying purchases and behaviors that create a bodily experience. See
BOURDIEU, supranote 12, at 77.
234. See ELLEN JOAN POLLOCK, TURKS AND BRAHMINS: UPHEAVAL AT
MILBANK, TWEED: WALL STREET'S GENTLEMEN TAKE OFF THEIR GLOvES 45-46

(1990) (describing how the law firm's culture of aristocratic manners and styles
were passed down from generation to generation); Chambliss, supra note 128,
at 18.
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high-status group. Another explanation may lie in the fact
that adopting upper-class manners and language styles
may actually help maintain public faith in the validity of
the legal profession and legal institutions. The detached
manners of the upper-class help represent the law as
neutral, objective, and non-violent, creating faith in the
the unfair ways in
fairness of legal process and obscuring
235
which the law privileges the powerful.
1. Acquiring Taste and Distinction. While in law school,
students acquire cultural capital and learn, either directly
or through observation, how to exhibit what Bourdieu calls
"taste" and "distinction,"236 and to participate in a
lifestyle 237 that will mark them as members of the legal
profession. Law students learn to pick up "mannerisms,
ways of speaking, gestures, which would be 'neutral' if they
were not emblematic of membership in the white middle
class male universe of the bar. '238 A rational, measured
tone is cultivated by observing law teachers comment,
critique, and correct student case analyses in the
Langellian/Socratic classroom. 239 Students may also learn
by interacting with their peers,
markers
class
understanding, for instance, that Brooks Brothers is the
proper place to go240to purchase a suit for an interview or a
court appearance.
235. See Bourdieu, supra note 18, at 830 (explaining how the law uses
"ascetic and simultaneously aristocratic attitudes" in order to transform
"conflicts of personal interest into rule-bound exchanges of rational arguments
between equal individuals").
236. See BOURDIEU, supra note 12, at 174-75, 249.
237. See id. at 169-77.
238. KENNEDY, supra note 175, at 80. However, I disagree with Professor
Kennedy's characterization of the law culture as "middle class."
239. See, e.g., MERTZ, supra note 119, at 21-22 (the teacher's use of language
in the law classroom brings students to a "new social identity"); Michael Hunter

Schwartz, Teaching Law By Design: How Learning Theory and Instructional
Design Can Inform and Reform Law Teaching, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347, 351
(2001) (The theory behind the Socratic method assumes "professor's comments,
questions, and corrections ... not only will help the selected student, but will
rub off on all the students in the class").
240. GRANFIELD, supra note 120, at 116-18. See also Peter Gabel,

Commentary, The Spiritual Foundationof Attachment to Hierarchy, in

LEGAL
EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY 154, 160 (2004) ("Lower-

middle class students learn not to wear an undershirt that shows, and that
certain patterns and fabrics in clothes will stigmatize them no matter what
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In law school, there is a danger of class bias in any
performance-based evaluation. For instance, through
comments by moot court judges, students learn that a
woman's legitimacy as an advocate depends on clothing
choices that match upper-class ideals of what a professional
woman should wear. 241 Or, a law student may receive the
comment that her speaking style and diction is too "forced"
and "unnatural" that, perhaps, she just does not have the
"gift" of oral advocacy. 242 In this way, members of the
dominant class devalue those skills that they deem "cannot
be learned," dismissing disadvantaged students because
they lack the "natural" abilities necessary for the practice of
law.

24 3

Students who are able to excel academically but who do
not master the necessary stylistic professional mannerisms
and lifestyle preferences may nonetheless find themselves
students
from
a job. 244 Further,
rejected
from
disadvantaged backgrounds who learn and acquire social
markers that signify the distinctive taste of the legal
profession are always vulnerable to a claim, from someone
with more power, that bluffing is going on. 245 Whenever a
student slips up in some way, by inadvertently using slang
or an accent, the fear is that the student will be exposed as
a charlatan. 246 While a legal education does give students a
their grades.").
241. See K.C. Worden, Overshooting the Target: A Feminist Deconstruction
of Legal Education, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1141, 1148-49 (1985). See also BARBARA
EHRENREICH, BAIT AND SWITCH: THE (FUTILE) PURSUIT OF THE AMERICAN DREAM

103-04 (Owl Books 2005) (explaining that acceptable professional business
attire should enable one to "pass as a hereditary member of the upper-middle
class").
242. See BOURDIEU & PASSERON, supra note 6, at 20-21, 167.
243. See id. at 130, 162.
244. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 179, at 1722-23
([T]he interview, or job test, rewards the candidate who has the
greatest store of cultural capital, the one who soaked up cultural
knowledge so easily at his father's or mother's knee. The household had
the right kind of music and books. The dinner table conversation
taught precisely the mannerisms, conversational patterns, and small
talk skills that the employer finds comforting, familiar, and
reassuring.)
245. See, e.g., supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
246. Bell Hooks, in writing about class in the undergraduate context,
explains the fear that if non-advantaged students shows any aspect of their
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chance to increase their status in the structure, students
often have no control over how they are perceived in these
performance-based evaluations 247
because those in power
control the classification system.
2. The Language of Distinction. Law school stresses a
measured, unemotional, and grammatically sound form of
communication, which correlates
to the preferred
communication style of the upper-class. 248 In so far as the
use of good grammar and tone is an upper-class
attribute, 249 law schools teach students that proper
grammar and a formal tone will cause readers to perceive
text as legitimate, whereas bad grammar or a strident,
emotional tone will cause the reader to view a text and its
author with suspicion. More substantively, a formal and
objective discourse helps present the law as neutral and
fair, perhaps obscuring the unfair results that happen
outside of the law's formal margins. 250 If we accept
vernacular culture in the classroom they will be "placed . . . always in the
position of [the] interloper." Bell Hooks, Confronting Class in the Classroom, in
THE CRITICAL PEDAGOGY READER 142, 145 (Antonia Darder et al. eds.,
RoutledgeFalmer 2003). Many non-advantaged students experience "psychic
turmoil" in trying to negotiate the conflict between what they view as their true
selves and the way they must present themselves in elite settings. Id.
247. See BOURDIEU, supra note 12, at 174-75.
248. See id. at 176-77; BOURDIEU & PASSERON, supra note 6, at 123-26
(although Bourdieu was writing about French citizens in the 1970s, the
description also correlates with American perceptions of a cultured or
distinguished speaking style). See also NELSON W. ALDRICH, OLD MONEY: THE
MYTHOLOGY

OF AMERICA'S

UPPER CLASS

88

(1996)

(describing

Theodore

Roosevelt's upper-class "cultured" words as "cool and gracious" whereas Huey
Long's lower-class speaking style involved shouting and over-gesticulation). Bell
Hooks, writing about her undergraduate classroom experiences, explains that
[1]oudness, anger, emotional outbursts, and even something as
seemingly innocent as unrestrained laughter were deemed
unacceptable, vulgar disruptions of classroom social order. These traits
were also associated with being a member of the lower classes. If one
was not from a privileged class group, adopting a demeanor similar to
that of the group could help one to advance.
Hooks, supra note 246, at 143.
249. One of the respondents, identified as working-class, in Granfield's
study of students at Harvard University stated that if she were from the middle
class, she would not have lapses of grammatical errors. GRANFIELD, supra note
120, at 113.
250. See, e.g., MERTZ, supra note 119, at 4-6, 212-14 (explaining the process
by which the law employs abstract and formalistic legal reasoning, which
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Bourdieu's theories about how class is mentally
internalized, then we should expect that law students will
come out of law school with the view that their education
has provided them with the natural way, the only way, to
think and speak about the law. 251 Moreover, because the
dominant discourse favored by the law tends to ignore those
narratives that do not fit into an acceptable form, students
are prevented from seeing the full effects of the law in
action.

III. THE MORAL DIMENSION-A SELF-CRITIQUE

Bourdieu argued that academics have a moral
obligation to study how educational institutions replicate
the class structure of our society. 252 As law teachers, we
should critique our own role in reproducing inequalities
within the legal profession. 253 At this point in my Essay, I
offer a reflective critique that asks whether or not legal
be
legal scholars-may
progressive
scholars-even
contributing to the subordination of students who graduate
from low-tier law schools. How does this happen? In this
section, I have identified two questions for law professors to
consider. First, how does the dominant research oriented
model of legal education reproduce the existing
stratification within the legal profession? Second, in
discourses about the legal profession and the role of legal
education, how do law teachers reinforce the low status
afforded to non-elite legal career choices? Then, from a
normative standpoint, I discuss some modest steps that we
might take to begin the process of dismantling the
institutional biases that produce the cultural dispositions
that enable hierarchy in the law and legal profession to
continue. Finally, I conclude with some thoughts on how
emphasizes procedure and precedent, at the expense of social context and moral
issues); Bourdieu, supra note 18, at 819-20 (explaining how the law receives its
force from "syntactic traits" that emphasize the passive and impersonal,
establishing impartiality and objectivity).
251. See BOURDIEU & PASSERON, supra note 6, at 21, 31-35; Bourdieu &
Champagne, supranote 17, at 424; Wacquant, supranote 9, at 24.
252. See, e.g., Wacquant, supra note 9, at 14; Weininger, supra note 15, at
117-18.
253. See Weininger, supra note 15, at 118 (citation omitted).
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we, as critics, should not ignore the experiential
understanding that our students have toward the legal
profession, which may conflict with the theory that they are
being subordinated.
A. Does Legal Education'sResearch and Scholarship
TraditionEncourage Stratification?
The most highly-ranked law schools are research
institutions 254 that adhere to a curriculum that has
historically been designed to prepare students for work in a
large law firm setting. 255 The research-based approach to
teaching and learning is rewarded by the U.S. News and
World Report ranking system. 256 Scholarly publications, no
matter how politically progressive-or even radical 25 7elevate a faculty member's professional status and her
institution's status. 258 On the other hand, many low-tier
254. See Garon, supra note 157, at 519-26 (Dean Garon explains how the
U.S. News and World Report grants high status to those institutions that
engage in "elitist" scholarship while devaluing schools that try to introduce
alternative student-oriented models of legal education); Terry, supra note 157,
at 667-75 (Professor Terry argues that instead of holding all law schools to the
standard of research institutions, law schools should be ranked on two different
tracks-research institutions and teaching institutions).
255. See KISSAM, supra note 147, at 10-11.
256. See Garon, supra note 157, at 524 (Dean Garon argues that faculty who
pursue "elitist standards of scholarship" in their own self interest and their
institutional self-interest, do so at the expense of quality teaching and student
learning).

257. See,

e.g.,

Duncan

Kennedy,

The

Structure

of

Blackstone's

Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979); George S. Swan, The Thirteenth
Amendment Dimensions of Roe v. Wade, 4 J. Juv. L. 1 (1980) (analogizing the
unborn to slaves).
258. This view is supported by Professor Leiter's increasingly popular
weblog rankings, which rank law schools based on faculty reputation, scholarly
output, and scholarly impact. See, e.g., Bryan Leiter, Bryan Leiter's Law School
Rankings, http://www.leiterrankings.com/faculty/index.shtml (last visited Oct.
11, 2008). Despite any criticisms that might be leveled against Leiter's system,
elite legal scholars of all persuasions are represented in his ranking system. See
also KISSAM, supra note 147, at 127, 162, 184. Kissam's thesis is that radical
reform-oriented legal theories do not succeed in changing the structure of legal
education because institutional structures mitigate the power of these theories
"by fragmenting, marginalizing and infiltrating them, by enfolding them within
itself and by ensuring that reforms serve rather than subvert the discipline's
values and practices." Id. at 126. Implicit in Kissam's critique is that reformbased legal theories lack teeth, in part, because radical theorists are corrupted
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schools define themselves as student-centered schools with
a mission to prepare students for the practice of law,
clients. 259
individual
representing
specifically-for
However, schools that emphasize teaching and practical
260
training do so at the expense of their prestige and rank.
Student-oriented teaching schools have long been dismissed
as mere trade schools, incapable of producing well-rounded
students with professional ideals. 26 1 Thus, in broad-strokes,
American legal education values research and scholarly
output, but devalues alternative educational models that
would be most useful
to attorneys who plan to represent
262
individual clients.
B. In Debating Where There Is Value Within the Legal
Profession, Do Law Teachers Reinforce the Low Status of
Non-Elite Law Students?
In debates about what types of law practice lawyers
have the most social value, the legal academy tends to
ignore individual client representation, the type of work
that many graduates of low-status schools end up doing.
For an example, we can look at the politicized debate
26 3
between "practical" scholarship and critical legal theory.
when they use their work to elevate their own institutional status. See id.
259. See Garon, supra note 157, at 524; Terry, supra note 157, at 670-71.
260. See Terry, supra note 157, at 670-71. See also Posting of Michael Dorf
to Dorf on Law,
http://michaeldorf.org/2007/09/did-chemerinsky-dodgebullet.html (Sept. 16, 2007, 00:01 EST) ("The schools that have made [practical
skills training] central to their curriculum, e.g., CUNY, Northeastern, have had
some local success, but that has not translated into moving themselves schools
[sic] up in the pecking order or getting the innovations widely adopted.").
261. As discussed, supra, the pejorative designation of a "trade school" dates
back to the turn of the century and was used to disparage students at part-time
night schools. STEVENS, supranote 120, at 113, 114-15. The appellation survives
in the present and is used to insult low-tier schools that emphasize teaching
and skills training. See Terry, supra note 157, at 668-69 nn.61-62.
262. See KISSAM, supra note 147, at 11 (explaining that the dominant model
of legal education in the United States is designed to train new associates for
corporate law firm jobs, but fails to even meet this limited goal). Professor
Kissam further explains that the entrenched form of legal training
"subordinates valuable teaching methods that address a broader set of legal
skills and different models of lawyers that are important to sectors of the legal
profession such as the representation of personal clients, public agency work
and small general practice law firms." Id.
263. For the conservative view of what scholarship should be, see Harry
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On one side in this debate, conservative elites believe that
legal education should prepare students for traditional
264
practice in the large law firm or judicial clerkship setting.
On the other hand, there are the progressive elites, who see
progressive, interdisciplinary learning as valuable for
students entering a career in law reform and public
service. 265 Encouraging elite students to enter a career in
law reform or public service mirrors the historic view that
law reform and public service are the special province for
elite, credentialed experts. 266 Strains of professionalism can
also be heard in the argument that law students must be
exposed to different interdisciplinary ways of thinking
about the law because law schools "are training people who
will be in profound positions of power-future
lawyers,
''267
judges, politicians, policymakers, and so on.
What these arguments miss is that many law students
from low-status schools are not getting anywhere near
Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). In this article, Judge Edwards argues
that "many law schools--especially the so-called 'elite' ones-have abandoned
their proper place, by emphasizing abstract theory at the expense of practical
scholarship and pedagogy. Id. at 34. For the progressive response to Edwards'

critique, see Derrick Bell & Erin Edmonds, Students As Teachers, Teachers As
Learners, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2025 (1993). In this article, the authors justify what

Judge Edwards calls "impractical theory" as helpful for students who "are
committed to careers in public service or law reform." Students, they argue,
need exposure to non-traditional legal theories so that they can "write briefs
that effectively challenge the many injustices that now threaten our society in
ways so dire, so dangerous, that few in policymaking positions are willing even
to contemplate, much less attempt, much-needed reform." Id. at 2026.
264. Although Judge Edwards does not explicitly say that law schools
should prepare students for large law firm practice, his belief that students
should master "basic doctrinal skills" reflects the traditional view that a
Langdellian legal education, steeped in doctrine, effectively prepares students
for large firm practice. Edwards, supra note 263, at 38; see KISSAM, supra note
147, at 11 (arguing that the dominant model of legal education is designed to
train "new associates for corporate law firms who are technically adept at
productive doctrinal analysis").
265. See, e.g., Bell & Edmonds, supra note 263, at 2026.
266. See AUERBACH, supra note 120, at 82-85 ("[The cry for reform,
trumpeted by law teachers, enhanced the prerogatives of those who fully
accepted the basic contours of the social system and trained young men for
success within it.").
267. Posting of Daniel Solove to Legal Affairs Debate Club,
http://www.legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_2yr0905.msp
(Sept. 20,
2005, 12:51 EST).
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"profound positions of power. ' 268 Due to economic barriers
or a perceived lack of credentials, many graduates of lowstatus institutions are thwarted from entering a corporate
law practice or a career in public service. It is well known
that elite law firms shut their doors to students who lack
elite credentials. 269 What is less publicized is that, because
of the limited opportunities available and because of the
law's systemic obsession with credentialed prestige, public
policy and public service jobs are also highly competitive,
requiring the same elite credentials and top grades that the
large firms require. 270 Moreover, many low-status law
school graduates, facing a median law school debt load of
nearly $90,000,271 decide that they cannot afford the low
salaries that public sector jobs pay. 272 Even though there
are large differences in salary between large firm practice
268. See id. The contrast between the normative concept of what attorneys
will be doing and the realities of a low-status practice becomes especially visible
when we look at what may be an emerging underclass of temporary attorneys,
some of whom are reportedly required to sign their name in front of a
supervisor in order to take a bathroom break. See Triedman, supra note 185, at
13; Posting of helpme123 to Temporary Attorney, supra note 185.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 201-04. See also Jonakait, supra
note 3, at 879-80 ("[T]he large-firm preference for elite school graduates
continues, and it can be expected to increase further."); David E. Van Zandt,
Merit at the Right Tail: Education and Elite Law School Admissions, 64 TEX. L.
REV. 1493, 1493-94 (1996) (reviewing ROBERT KLITGAARD, CHOOSING ELITES
(1985)).
270. See, e.g., Georgetown Law School, Office of Public Interest and
Community
Service,
Fellowship
Planning
Timeline,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/opics/fellowships/timeline.html (last visited Oct.
11, 2008) ('Wany students are surprised to learn that, despite the huge
disparity in salaries, public interest jobs are harder to obtain than large law
firm jobs."); The University of Chicago Law School, Public Service and Public
Interest
Opportunities,
http://www.law.uchicago.edulcareersvcs/publicservice.html (last visited Oct.
11, 2008) ("[E]ven unpaid [summer] positions can be hard to get, because public
interest employers are not equipped to handle an inflow of 50 to 100 summer
associates in the way that large law firms can.").
271. For the 2006-2007 academic year, the median debt load for private law
school graduates was $87,906; the debt load for public law school graduates was
$57,170. American Bar Association Lawyer Statistics, Average Amount
Borrowed, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/charts/stats%20-%2020.pdf
(last visited Oct. 11, 2008).
272. For instance, the minimum yearly salary required to make payments
on an $80,145 debt load is $42,493. George B. Shepherd, No African-American
Lawyers Allowed: The Inefficient Racism of the ABA's Accreditation of Law
Schools, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 103, 136 tbl. (2003).
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and public interest work, both areas of practice enjoy a
certain amount of symbolic prestige.2 7 3 Although the
statistics vary, approximately one-third of all lawyers in the
United States are solo-practitioners who represent
individual clients.27 4 And yet, this career trajectory is not
considered, by the profession or the academy, as having any
kind of prestige.
The problem is that the business of the elite schools
remains the same as it has always been: preparing elite
students for law practice-either in a private law firm
setting or in the culturally prestigious public interest
sector. The career plans of low-tier students, who are
effectively shut out (for lack of elite credentials or because
of economic barriers) from these high-status areas, are
devalued. It does not help matters that the vast majority of
law teachers have been inculcated at elite educational
institutions, 275 which creates a gulf between the actual
experiences of low-status students and the experiences and
273. See, e.g., BOURDIEU, supra note 4, at 182-83 (defining symbolic prestige
in cultural, rather than economic terms). But see HEINZ ET AL., supra note 2, at
95-96. In the Urban Lawyers survey, when participants were asked to rank
practice areas in terms of prestige, public defenders and other lawyers for
impoverished clients received a low prestige rank. Id. However, in a slightly
different survey question, responders gave "civil rights/civil liberties" work a
higher prestige rank. Id. at 84. Notwithstanding the somewhat ambiguous
nature of the survey results, my argument is that reform traditions at the elite
law schools have stamped these career choices with a certain amount of honor,
if not prestige.
274. The lawyer demographic statistics compiled by the American Bar
Association (last updated for the year 2000) indicate that of the 74% of
attorneys in private practice, 48% are solo practitioners. American Bar
Association Lawyer Demographics, http://www.abanet.org/marketresearch/
LawyerDemographics_2007.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2008). The After the J.D.
study found that 32% of all recent graduates had entered into a sole practice.
DINOVITZER ET AL., supra note 2, at 27. With respect to small-firm practice, a
recent NALP survey indicated that 71% of the graduates of the class of 2006
went into practice at law firms with 50 attorneys or less. Press Release, NALP, A
Picture Worth 1,000 Words (2007), http://www.nalp.org/contentlindex.php?pid=522.
However, there are other data sources that indicate that the percentage of
attorneys entering into sole practice, particularly in urban areas, is shrinking.
See HEINZ ET AL., supranote 2, at 100, fig.5.1 (indicating that the percentage of
sole practice attorneys practicing in Chicago has diminished from 21% in 1975
to 15% in 1995).
275. See, e.g., Brian Leiter's Law School Rankings, Where Tenure Track
Faculty Went To Law School, 2000-02, http://www.leiterrankings.com/
faculty/2000faculty-education.shtml (last visited Oct. 11, 2008).
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expectations of their teachers. The academy's failure to
value the experiences of non-elite attorneys might also
reflect an upper-class contempt for working attorneys who
276
provide legal services in order to make a living.
Academics
should ask whether or not we are
communicating meanings that favor elite members of the
legal profession and discourage questions about how the
277
profession's tiered structure is created and maintained.
As law teachers, we should be willing to critique ourselves,
because, as Bell Hooks has pointed out, "there can be no
intervention that challenges the status quo if we are not
willing to interrogate the way our presentation of self as
well as our pedagogical process is often shaped by middle278
class norms."
The danger of silence is that it strengthens the habitus,
making the institution a more fertile mechanism for
reproducing existing inequalities, within our profession and
within our society as a whole. 279 In writing about the
danger of not building in a critical discourse for students
learning the language of the law, Professor Elizabeth Mertz
points out that the law "does not have a mechanism by
which its own basic orientations and structure can be
opened to question. ' 280 American legal education
institutions mirror and reinforce this closed system by
ignoring inquiry into how its underlying structures
reproduce pre-existing inequalities. Developing a critical
self-awareness will open up dialogues that help us identify
ways to share the resources of our legal educational
institutions in a way that furthers the liberating
and
democratic ideals of American legal education. 281
276. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
277. See BOURDIEU & PASSERON, supra note 6, at 8.
278. Hooks, supra note 246, at 147; see also BOURDIEU, supra note 4, at 18889.
279. See BOURDIEU, supra note 4, at 188-89.

280. MERTZ, supranote 119, at 219.
281. Thurgood Marshall's legal education is but one example of the
liberating effect that a legal education can have. In discussing the legacy of
Brown v. Board of Education, David Wilkins aptly pointed out the race/class
divide between Thurgood Marshall and John W. Davis. David B. Wilkins, From

"SeparateIs Inherently Unequal" To "DiversityIs Good For Business" The Rise
of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black CorporateBar,
117 HARv. L. REV. 1548, 1548-49 (2004). Harvard educated Davis, "as the senior
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C. Normative Strategies
What follows represents some actions that we, as
educators, might take to weaken the power of the
institutional mechanisms that reproduce the economic and
cultural stratification within the legal profession and our
society. However, because our institutions are so deeply
entrenched in the U.S. News and World Report system of
tiered prestige and because law schools are not likely to
give up what power and prestige they have amassed, I
recognize that these strategies may not do anything more
than remove a thin layer of the foundational structure.
Nonetheless, I think it is important to imagine how
alternative models of legal education and legal services
could lead to substantive reform.
1. Embrace Alternative Educational Models. Professor
Randolph Jonakait argues that low-status "local" law
schools should make more of an effort to teach lessons that
will be useful to students planning to represent individual
clients. 282 I would go one step further and urge legal
education to stop devaluing this type of instruction. Schools
that emphasize skills training should not be penalized by
the law school rankings system, which expects every school
partner of the Wall Street law firm Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland &
Kiendl[,]... epitomized the power and prestige of the [white] elite corporate bar
in the years following World War II." Id. at 1548. Far apart from Davis's world
of "corporate titans, elite standing, and sumptuous fees" stood the Howard
educated Thurgood Marshall, who struggled as a solo practitioner before being
hired as the NAACP's second full-time attorney. Id. at 1549 & n.8. See also,
JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY (1998). Juan
Williams relates a revealing conversation with Justice Marshall that
demonstrates the potential for breaking out of the hierarchal mold of "top-tier"
school thinking:

Q: Do you ever feel like these guys (colleagues on the court) have had a
better education?
A: No, I don't see anybody, I don't think so. Do they have SJD's? I don't
think anybody here, no. But they're from better law schools. They're
from Harvard, I'm from Howard. It didn't compare with Harvard.

Q: Do you wish you had a better education to compete with these guys?
A: Oh no, no. I know as many cases as they do....
Interview
by
Juan
Williams
with
Thurgood
Marshall,
http://www.thurgoodmarshall.com/interviews/justices.htm (last visited Oct. 11,
2008).
282. See Jonakait, supranote 3, at 864, 887-901.
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to model itself after Ivy League research-oriented
institutions.283 If we can give students the entrepreneurial
and practice tools that will enable them to develop
successful law practices that do not follow the dominant
large law firm model, that may create a competitive threat
to the large law firm model, which in turn might lead to a
reorganization of how status is allocated within the
profession. Indeed, large law firms may soon have to change
the way they do business as younger lawyers, who value
time and flexibility more than traditional notions of status
and prestige, may start choosing entrepreneurial
small firms or sole practices in
opportunities available28 at
4
lieu of big firm careers.
2. Recognize the Value of Alternative Career Paths. Law
teachers should also consider redefining the types of law
practice that we value. Either by choice or because of
credential-based exclusion, a student from a low-status
school is likely to enter practice as a solo practitioner or
work at a small firm doing personal injury work, criminal
28 5
defense work, family law, or residential real-estate law.
From recent studies that have been done on the legal
profession, we know that many attorneys view these types
of law practices as low-status work. 28 6 For instance,

283. See, e.g., Garon, supra note 157, at 522-26; Terry, supra note 157, at
667-75. I agree with Dean Garon that the rankings system should begin
recognizing and rewarding different models of legal education. I do not agree,
however, with Professor Terry's idea that legal education should divide itself
into two tracks or even two ranking systems-one for practical education and
one for academic/research education. Formally separating legal education into
two tracks would exacerbate the existing status differences within the law and
may take us down the path of de jure stratification, as envisioned by Alfred
Reed in 1921. See, e.g., ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC
PROFESSION OF THE LAW 419 (1921).

284. In fact, law firms are already struggling with the legal profession's
decline in status among younger attorneys, who view status in terms of "ideas
of flexibility and creativity, concepts alien to seemingly everyone but art
students even a generation ago." Alex Williams, The FallingDown Professions,
at
available
at
1,
2008,
§9,
6,
TIMES,
Jan.
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/06/fashion/6professions.html?_r=l&oref=slogi
n.

285. See, e.g., HEINZ ETAL., supra note 2, at 58-59; Jonakait, supra note 3, at
864, 875.
286. See Jonakait, supra note 3, at 903-04; see also HEINZ ET AL., supranote
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personal injury attorneys are still characterized as greedy
ambulance chasers. 28 7 Criminal defense attorneys who
defend paying clients are also considered to have low status
and a practice that requires little intellectual skill. 285
An attorney who helps a client receive compensation for
a personal injury may not be pursuing social justice in its
traditional sense, but there is an important social purpose
served in helping individuals obtain remedies for wrongs
done to them (often by corporations). Similarly, defending
persons accused of a crime in exchange for legal fees, is not
public service in the traditional sense (public defender work
would be), but attorneys who do this work provide a
valuable service within our justice system. The same can be
said for attorneys who provide middle-income and lowerincome individuals with access to legal services in the realm
of family law and residential real-estate. Small firm and
sole practice models also allow us to re-imagine law practice
in ways that differ from the oppressive large firm model,
with
its
entrenched
hierarchies,
billable
hours
requirements, and commitment to big-business private law.
Working at a small law firm or in sole practice provides an
attorney with more autonomy to choose to serve
underserved clients or perform community service. 28 9 For
2, at 81-97; ZEMANS & ROSENBLUM, supra note 2, at 94.
287. See Mary Nell Trautner, How Social Hierarchies Within the Personal
Injury Bar Affect Case Screening Decisions, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 215, 216
(2006-07) ("Plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers are commonly portrayed as
greedy 'ambulance chasers' who will take any case regardless of merit."); see
also John Fabian Witt, Op-Ed., FirstRename All the Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
24, 2006, at A29 (concluding that although the personal injury tort lawyers'
association changed its name from the Association of American Trial Attorneys
to the American Association for Justice [in order to improve their image], "some
will say that the trial lawyers are still chasing ambulances").
288. See Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, Can a Reasonable Doubt Have an
UnreasonablePrice? Limitations on Attorney's Fees in Criminal Cases, 41 B.C.
L. REV. 1, 51-52 n.254 (1999) (collecting sources reporting that most attorneys
view criminal defense work as having low status and low prestige). See also,
HEINZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 93-97 (indicating that the lawyers surveyed in the
study gave a low prestige rank to criminal defense work). On the other hand,
certain types of criminal defense work, capital cases, for instance, might be
considered prestigious because of its association with reform oriented public
service. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
289. There is a conflict, within western educational institutions, between
teaching students to become participants in a democratic society and training
students to function in "relatively authoritarian work regimes." See MERTZ,
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instance, David Wilkins has argued that attorneys at small
minority-owned law firms are more likely to represent
minority clients, engage in community service, and mentor
younger attorneys than minority attorneys at majority law
firms. 290 Others see small and sole firm models as providing
a format for women to create profitable part-time and flextime practices, particularly in high-tech suburbs,
where
telecommuting is an acceptable way of working. 291
D. In Critiquingthe Legal Profession and Legal Education,
Law Teachers Should Not Ignore the Subjective
Experiences of Students
Finally, we should look at the social effects of criticizing
the idea that law school is an instrument of empowerment
and social good when so many students and their families
are relying on a law degree to raise their status in the
system and their self-esteem. 292 We should be loathe to
destroy the self-esteem that our students have built up for
themselves, based on their attendance at law school. This
relates back to the paradox Bourdieu identified as the
empowering nature of subordination and the alienating

supra note 119, at 25. To the extent that law professors are uncomfortable with
our role of preparing students for the "authoritarian work regime" of a large
firm corporate practice, training students to enter alternative practice models in
which they have more autonomy and control over their work presents a more
satisfying role.
290. See Wilkins, supra note 281, at 1604 n.240 (explaining that lawyers
working at smaller, minority-owned law firms are more likely "to serve black
individuals and small black businesses, to mentor young black lawyers
(including ones in other institutions), and otherwise to be an important
presence in the black community").
291. See Carroll Seron, The Status of Legal Professionalism at the Close of
the Twentieth Century: Chicago Lawyers and Urban Lawyers, 32 LAw & Soc.
INQUIRY 581, 602-03 (2007).
292. In a comment written in response to Duncan Kennedy's Legal
Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A Polemic Against the System,
Peter Gabel argues that "the only plausible explanation for why law students
don't spontaneously resist and reject their assimilation to a hierarchy that
'maims' them and deprives them of their authentic selfhood is that the
reproduction of hierarchy is the reproduction of our own social alienation, to
which, absent some liberating social movement that frees us for a more
authentic form of social connection, we have no choice but to succumb." Gabel,
supra note 240, at 161-62.
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nature of resistance. 293 Many students who attend low-tier
law schools buy into the liberal idea that law school and the
law is an instrument of good. Many students from lower
socio-economic backgrounds look forward to the upward
social mobility and membership in a high-prestige
profession when they obtain their degree. 294 Of course, in
order to reach
this point, we must teach our students to be
"gentlemen" 295 who can conform to the rules, speak the
language of the law, and display all of the correct
mannerisms required for entry to the profession. Whether
we accept the view that this conformity is subordination or
not, obtaining the degree and passing the bar leads to a
very real personal
and family happiness and sense of
296
empowerment.
Thus, when we speak about law school as a negative
mechanism that subordinates and reproduces class
hierarchies, we risk maligning the self-esteem of our
students. Some might argue that it is best to tell all law
students, elite and non-elite, to be proud in their
accomplishments and not to question the inequalities
within the legal profession or how those inequalities have
come to be. However, a greater risk inures when students
never see beyond the myths that hide the arbitrary location
of the chutes that determine status within the profession.
Students need to be armed before they enter the field of law
so that they can predict how their reputation and status
will be affected, make reasoned choices in response to the
realities and, ultimately, refuse to buy into the myths that
explain their place in the profession.

293. See Wacquant, supra note 9, at 23-24.
294. See ZEMANS & ROSENBLUM, supra note 2, at 30-31 (explaining that one
of the most popular reasons that students give for attending law school is the
prospect of an above average income and the social prestige that comes from
being an attorney); Dinovitzer & Garth, supra note 2, at 38-39 (explaining that
students at low-status schools view law school as a means for social mobility).
295. See, e.g., LANi GuINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW
SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997). The title of Professor Guinier's book
derives from advice a male professor gave a first-year class: "To be a good
lawyer, behave like a gentleman." Id. at 29.
296. In his commentary to Kennedy's polemic, Peter Gabel warns that we
should not expect students to resist hierarchy as soon as they learn about it
because students may be more inclined to avoid the social suffering that might
occur in an act of resistance. Gabel, supranote 240, at 163.
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Critiquing ourselves and identifying ways that we, as
teachers, might be unconsciously contributing to the nonegalitarian structure of legal education and the legal
profession is a vital step, but it is equally important that we
identify active teaching approaches that we can employ in
the classroom to ensure that we do not reproduce a mindset
in our students that enables stratification to continue
within the legal profession. But more importantly, critical
evaluation of ourselves and our teaching may also help
prevent legal processes from continuing to operate in a way
that privileges the advantaged while maintaining the
appearance of neutrality and reason. With this goal in
mind, what follows are some ideas for discussions that
teachers might conduct to bring students to understand
how class bias is invisibly interwoven throughout American
legal institutions.
IV. PEDAGOGICAL STRATEGIES

Opponents of our current system would agree that a
law teacher should induce something of a critical
consciousness 297 in her students, creating an awareness of
the ways in which the law school system replicates class
structure, which harms current and future students of the
law as well as the rest of society. 298 On the other hand, as
law teachers, we also have an obligation to teach our
students the mannerisms and skills they will need to
succeed in the practice of law. This necessarily means that
we will be teaching our students explicit and implicit
lessons on upper-class mores. How can we teach these
lessons while also criticizing them? The compromise I
propose is to instill a critical class consciousness in students
while still teaching the skills necessary to succeed at the
law game. Paulo Freire's concept of critical consciousness
or, Conscientizacdo, is the ability of a person to reflect on
297. See

PAULO FREIRE, EDUCATION FOR CRITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

16-20

(Myra Bergman Ramos ed. & trans., 1994).
298. It is also possible to change the law school institution from the outside.
Franklin Snyder has proposed that the emergence of non-hierarchical webbased discourse through law blogs and Social Science Research Network
(SSRN) might actually lead to a "breaking down of caste." Franklin G. Snyder,

Late Night Thoughts on Blogging While Reading Duncan Kennedy's Legal
Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy in an Arkansas Motel Room, 11
NEXUS 111, 121-24 (2006).
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herself and her role in the cultural climate, thereby
transcending a naive or magical understanding of reality. 299
However, teaching critical consciousness within the context
of law school creates a liar's paradox because we are
teaching students to be critical of the system while at the
same time teaching the skills necessary to succeed within
that system. 300 Lori Lefkovitz, writing about this paradox in
teaching
remedial
English
composition
at
the
undergraduate level, suggests we teach students to
recognize the margins: "To teach students to write within
the margins of the page and the culture, to obey the rules of
the dominant discourse, and to be aware of the possibilities
for challenging the placement of30margins, we need to make
the margins themselves visible."
As a practical method for making visible the
metaphorical margins dividing dominant legal tradition
from the real work of people's lawyers, I suggest a
classroom teaching paradigm that focuses on posing a series
of questions to students designed to shed light on the ways
in which the production of law tends to privilege the views
of socially dominant groups while excluding and
marginalizing the experiences and voices of lower status
groups. The idea underlying such a paradigm is that
students will not only learn the rules encapsulated within
dominant legal texts, but will also learn to see beyond the
text and into the processes by which rules of law are
formulated and canonized. Some of the areas that would
lend themselves to critical student inquiry might include
judicial authorship, the routines by which attorneys make
their living, the professional ideals ensconced in American
ethics rules, and the curricular choices that law schools
offer students.
299. See FREIRE, supra note 297, at 18-19. The Bourdieu corollary to Freire's
magical or naive understanding of reality is the habitus, where one does not
question the external structures which are embodied in her internal structures,
but rather, because of objectification, accepts the world the way it is as the
natural way, as a matter of course. See BOURDIEU, supra note 4, at 80. Freire
himself developed a way to develop critical consciousness while also successfully
teaching Brazilian students how to read and write. See FREIRE, supra note 297,
at 41-58.
300. See BOURDIEU & PASSERON, supra note 6, at 12.
301. Lori H. Lefkovitz, The Subject of Writing Within the Margins, in
REORIENTATIONS,

CRITICAL

THEORIES

AND

Henricksen & Thais E. Morgan eds., 1990).

PEDAGOGIES

168,

172 (Bruce

20081

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

1215

A. JudicialAuthorship
In the process of teaching legal doctrine, law teachers
might consider leading students to see how the process of
judicial authorship, which relies on an objective veneer of
neutrality and objectivity, reduces judicial actors to
inhuman objects, thereby obscuring the way in which the
law privileges the views of dominant groups and ignores the
experiences of less powerful groups. 302 As a starting place,
we might turn to the now-classic example of Judge
Noonan's retelling of the Palsgraf decision. 30 3 In this case,
familiar to law students and lawyers alike, Judge Cardozo
shifted issues of tort liability, based on foreseeability of the
harm suffered, away from the jury question of proximate
of a
cause and instead analyzed foreseeability in terms
30 4
relational duty owed, a question of law for the judge.
Under Cardozo's approach, because plaintiffs had to fit
foreseeability issues into a strict judge-controlled doctrine
rather than having a jury resolve these issues, it became
more difficult for torts plaintiffs to win cases. Although
Judge Cardozo's approach is no longer favored, the decision,
along with Judge Andrews' dissent, continues to function as
a cannon of tort law. 30 5 Upon reading Noonan's account of
the decision, we see how Judge Cardozo employed his
famous clipped prose style to excise all personal
information, reducing the case actors to abstract characters

302. See generally Bourdieu, supra note 18, at 848 (explaining how the
operation of the law allows dominant groups to "impose an official
representation of the social world which sustains their own world view and
favors their interests"). Professor Penelope Pether has also written about how
the process of judicial authorship impoverishes American law, through the
institutional hierarchy created by judges, "elbow" law clerks, and staff
attorneys. Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks
and Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1 (2007). Specifically,
Professor Pether points out how the court's bureaucratic and hierarchical
structures create ingrained habitus that privileges certain types of cases
(corporate and complex civil litigation) over others (criminal and pro-se
appeals). Id. at 53-54.
303. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928); JOHN T. NOONAN,
JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE
AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 111-51 (1976).
304. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL

HISTORY 98-99, 125 (2003).
305. See id. at 138.
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that might appear in a law school hypothetical. 30 6 Left out
of the published opinion are the facts that Mrs. Palsgraf
was a "very poor" mother of three children who made $416
a year as a house cleaner with substantial legal and
medical debts. 30 7 The Court of Appeals' award of $350 in
court costs against Mrs. Palsgraf left her a destitute debtor,
owing money to her doctor, her lawyer, and the Long Island
Railroad Company (which, at the time, had at least $100
million dollars in assets).3 08 The great logical power of
Judge Cardozo's foreseeability/duty rule depends, in part,
on his removal of all references to the personal and
economic hardships suffered by the plaintiff as a result of
the rule's application.
One question worth posing to students is how and why
did Cardozo come to decide that these personal facts were
not relevant for crafting the rule of law? Judge Cardozo's
approach in this famous decision is emblematic of the
linguistic approach that Professor Mertz identifies as the
"filtering linguistic ideology" implicit in legal language. 309
The Palsgraf decision thus "focus[es] on form, authority,
and legal-linguistic contexts rather than on content,
morality, and social contexts." 310 This detached and
unemotional language of the law instills a sense of public
faith in the neutrality of modern democratic legal processes
and hides the social inequities and injustices that result
from the operation of the law. 311
306. See NOONAN, supra note 303, at 112-13. Jerome Frank also critiqued
Cardozo for using "a private time-machine to transport himself back into 18th
Century England" in order to translate "himself into a past alien speech
environment." Anon Y. Mous, The Speech of Judges: A Dissenting Opinion, 29
VA. L. REV. 625, 631 (1943) (Jerome Frank). Cardozo's language allowed him to
promote his prose as reasoned analysis when, in Judge Posner's view, it was
really a "substitution of words for thought." RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A
STUDY IN REPUTATION 119 (1990).

307. See NOONAN, supra note 303, at 125-28.
308. See id. at 128-29, 139, 144.
309. MERTZ, supra note 119, at 5.
310. Id.
311. See, e.g., MERTZ, supra note 119 and accompanying text (explaining the
process by which law internalize abstract and formalistic legal reasoning, which
emphasizes procedure and precedent, at the expense of social context and moral
issues); Bourdieu, supra note 18, at 819-20 (explaining how the law receives its
force from "syntactic traits" that emphasize the passive and impersonal,
establishing impartiality and objectivity).
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Judge Cardozo may have also had a more personal need
to maintain objectivity and neutrality in his judicial
opinions. Justice Cardozo's father, Albert Cardozo, served
as a New York State Supreme Court Judge during New
York's Tammany Hall era and faced trial for corruption
before resigning from the bench in disgrace. 312 Did Cardozo
create his famous detached prose style as a defensive
measure, to distance himself from the "corrupt" ethnic
lawyer represented by his father? 313 We might use the
Palsgrafcase and others like it to point out how formalism
works to dehumanize judicial actors, obscure the unfair
effects that court decisions have on low- status groups, and
serve institutional and self-preservation goals by building
public faith in the legal system and elevating the status of
the text's author. 314 A deeper understanding of how
dominant legal texts are produced and canonized show
students another way in which our legal institutions use
hidden mechanisms to allocate power in unfair ways.
B. Demystifying the Routine and Mundane
John Noonan's retelling of the Palsgrafcase also allows
us to take a peak into the bureaucracized world of legal
practice where legal decisions and strategy are not always
made in the best interest of the client in a space with
unlimited resources, but instead reflect the limitations
imposed by money and time. John Henry Schlegel describes
this world as containing
the conditions in which the lawyer practices-the need to earn a
living, the need to keep various bureaucracies essential to daily
life reasonably happy, the client's ability to pay, and ethical or

312. See NOONAN, supra note 303, at 143. See also RICHARD POLENBERG, THE
WORLD OF BENJAMIN CARDozO 24-31 (1997).

313. See generally COLLINS, supra note 120, at 152-53 (detailing upper-class
attorneys' xenophobic and class-based fears of corrupt ethnic attorneys
affiliated with the urban political machines that had risen to power around the
turn of the century). Jerome Frank seems to think that Cardozo could have
crafted his judicial writing style in reaction to the embarrassment of his father's
corruption trial. See Mous, supra note 306, at 625, 630.
314. While one judge (Jerome Frank) was not impressed with Cardozo,
another was enamored of his style. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 306, at 42
(celebrating the economy of the Palsgrafstatement of facts as "refreshing and
. in striking contrast to the flaccid prolixity of ordinary judicial prose").
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moral obligations, both self and other-imposed-all of which
influence what
a lawyer is capable of doing to meet the client's
15
objectives.

As Jerome Frank pointed out long ago, 316 there is often
a disconnect between how law is represented in the
classroom, where strategy and choice is not limited by time
or money, and how lawyers really practice law. For
instance, in his retelling of the Palsgraf case, Noonan
describes the railroad company's defense counsel as a
"workmanlike lawyer earning his salary with an economy of
motion. ' 317 The solo practitioner who represented Mrs.
Palsgraf is said to have presented an "economical" and
"sparely presented and sparely financed case. ' 318 We see
how economic realities shape legal outcomes again when
the legal services of the junior railroad company attorney is
characterized as being "cheap"-which negatively affected
the plaintiffs leverage for settlement. 319 When law
professors review cases and charge that the negative
outcome for the plaintiff was a result of the lawyer's failure
to ask questions or failure to take the time to investigate
the facts more thoroughly, 320 they present the idea that
legal solutions are to be considered in space where time,
money, and other concepts related to making a living do not
come into play. This is rarely how practice works in real
life.
To provide another example from Schlegel, when
criminal procedure professors chastise graduates for failing
to present every available defense in a pretrial motion, they
ignore the complex maze of competing interests that
315. John Henry Schlegel, But Pierre, If We Can't Think Normatively, What
Are We to Do?, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 955, 962 (2003).
316. See generally Jerome Frank, Why Not A ClinicalLawyer-School?, 81 U.
PA. L. REV. 907 (1933) (pointing out the chasm between the type of knowledge
learned in law school and what lawyers learn from practice).
317. See NOONAN, supra note 303, at 122.
318. See id. at 124.
319. See id. at 125.
320. See, e.g., Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem Solving vs. the Case Method:
A Marvelous Adventure in Which Winnie-The-Pooh Meets Mrs. Palsgraf,34 CAL.
W. L. REV. 351, 368 (1998) (criticizing Ms. Palsgrafs attorney for not asking
more context based questions that would have developed a more context based
case theory).
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criminal defense have to get through, in the form of limited
fees, limited time, and pressure from judges and
prosecutors alike, not to file pretrial motions that would
retard the case's progress on the trial calendar. 321 But we
really cannot fault law professors too much for following the
ingrained view that lawyering is a noble calling where
income just happens as a matter of course. 322 I am not
saying that we should accept the hard choices, between
achieving success for clients and making a living, that
lawyers confront in the trenches every day. I agree with
Schlegel in thinking that empirical scholarship that seeks
to demystify and reform these micro routines is something
that would benefit students, especially students "who are
not to the manor born," but I also agree that such endeavors
present challenges, for this subject is not at all sexy or
catchy. 323 Sidestepping the question of a scholarship of
micro routines, it would be beneficial for law teachers to
teach law in a way that conveys some of the complex,
bureaucratic, and mechanized ways in which it is actually
practiced, even if the picture is not always pretty. Despite
the resounding lack of support for any idea that pushes
legal education in the direction of a "trade school," I would
hope that law professors appreciate that students come to
law school to learn to be lawyers and acquire all of the
upwardly mobile benefits that being a lawyer entails. I do
not think we should deny our students in that regard.
C. ProfessionalIdentity
Professional Responsibility courses may offer another
chance to raise student consciousness of the ways that the
legal profession replicates its hierarchical structure. While
students must learn the Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility in order to pass the Multi-State Professional
Responsibility Exam, 324 there is no reason not to expose
students to the eye-opening historical background behind
321. Schlegel, supranote 315, at 965-66.
322. See, e.g., supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
323. Schlegel, supra note 315, at 963-64. Schlegel reminds us that the law's
"institutions, assumptions, and circumstances" are upper-middle-class
institutions. Id. at 964.
324. See Paul T. Hayden, PuttingEthics to the (NationalStandardized) Test:
Tracing the Origins of the MPRE, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1299, 1303 (2003).
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many of the ABA's canons of professional responsibility,
particularly the rules regarding lawyer advertising, direct
solicitation, and contingency fees. As explained in part
above, 325 the cadre of upper-class WASP lawyers who
dominated the ABA and local bar associations adopted the
first ethics canons in response to a perceived threat to the
profession from the influx of ethnic and immigrant
326
attorneys into American cities at the turn of the century.
And, although WASP ascendancy is no longer the story for
the legal profession, pieces of that culture remain in
contemporary law practice, in the form of wood-paneled
walls, oil paintings of named partners, golf outings, and
Brooks Brothers uniforms.
While students must learn the rules, they should also
be able to critique these rules and see that many of these
rules (such as the prohibitions on lawyer advertising) may
have been designed to subordinate lower caste attorneys
rather than preventing any kind of palpable harm to the
public. 327 Moreover, as students contemplate professional
ideals such as Kronman's lawyer-statesman model, which
idealizes the everyman lawyer who never seems to worry
about money, but instead is "a devoted citizen . . . [who]
cares about the public good and is prepared to sacrifice his
own well-being for it,"328 they should question whether
these tropes create a profession that truly serves the public
good or whether they are just self-serving narratives that
preserve the social
power that attorneys have amassed in
American society. 329

325. See supra text accompanying notes 142-44.
326. See AUERBACH, supra note 120, at 40-42, 48-52 (explaining that many
jurisdictions adopted ethics codes in response to perceived threats that
immigrant attorneys practicing in urban areas were lowering the status of the
legal profession as a whole).
327. See id. at 43. See also Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism as Class
Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 657, 672 (1994)
(explaining that "the ABA's ethics codes replicate[ ] the hierarchy and prestige
strata of the legal profession by codifying the self-serving judgments of those
who had (and still have) power in the ABA").
328. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 13-14 (1993).

329. See, e.g., HEINZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 221-22 (citing KRONMAN, supra
note 328, at 363-64).
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D. Alternatives to ProfessorKingsfield's Bow-Tie330
Finally, law teachers might lead students to question
why they are taught the law in a certain way. Elite schools
are in a better position to teach the law from a more
theoretical and critical perspective than less elite
institutions.3 3 1 Doctrinal teachers at low-status schools with
bar pass challenges would like to teach alternative methods
and competing theories for analyzing the law, but we are
often constrained to teach legal substance and analysis in a
conservative way so that students can reproduce their
knowledge of the law in a form that will be rewarded by the
bar examiners. 332 The specter of the bar examination also
affects the curricular choices that a school can offer its
students. 333 The curriculum at low-status schools is often
made up of a large number of core required classes with few

330. In the 1973 movie, The Paper Chase, actor John Houseman portrayed
fictional Harvard law professor, Charles Kingsfield, a bow-tie wearing
curmudgeon who used the Socratic method to browbeat his students. THE PAPER
CHASE (Twentieth Century Fox Corp. 1973). Despite having been created over
25 years ago, the Kingsfield character still resonates, which is perhaps a
testament that legal education has not changed much since the 1970s. To this
day, many law students will express fear that their professor will go "Professor
Kingsfield" on them in class.
331. See, e.g., MERTZ, supra note 119, at 209-10 (collecting sources
supporting the theory that elite schools favor more critical and theoretical
pedagogies than less elite schools). See also HEINZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 57
(explaining a study of curricular offerings at Chicago area law schools
indicating that the most elite schools offered the most interdisciplinary
courses).
332. See Joan Howarth, Teaching in the Shadow of the Bar, 31 U.S.F. L.
REV. 927, 928 (1997) (explaining how "bar exams determine the curriculum that
schools teach . . . [by creating a] canon of legal education, making certain
courses central and exiling others to the periphery"); Society of American Law
Teachers Statement on the Bar Exam, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 446, 448-49 (2002)
(generally discussing how the bar exam affects student choices in structuring
their education, leading students to take subjects tested on the bar examination
at the expense of clinical courses and interdisciplinary courses). See also supra
text accompanying note 203 (discussing how the bar examination leads law
schools to deemphasize practical skills instruction that would be useful for
lawyers entering sole or small firm practice). By way of example, property law
teachers must teach the antiquated property-rights subjects (the Rule Against
Perpetuities, Shelley's case, etc.) at the expense of subjects (redlining practices)
that are more aligned to social justice issues.
333. See Howarth, supra note 332, at 928-29.

1222

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

chances to take interdisciplinary classes.33 4 While lowstatus schools must hew to the dominant methods of
analyzing and learning about the law, because that is what
is rewarded on the bar examination, students can still be
exposed to competing legal theories and gain an
understanding of why and how only certain ways of
discussing the law are recognized as legitimate. After
reading
Elizabeth
Mertz's
detailed research
that
instantiates the long-held criticism that the case-method
indoctrinates students into a very confined understanding
of the law that tends to wash out all social differences in
favor of a body of abstract legal principles, 335 I began to
think that more collaborative pedagogic approaches might
be another solution. 336 Clinical and skills teachers, having a
greater ability to teach more client-centered approaches to
lawyering, are in a unique position to teach legal knowledge
in a contextual way that weakens the "thinking like a
lawyer" constrictions. 337 For instance, as Joan Smith

334. See id.; see also HEINZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 57 (explaining a study of
curricular offerings at Chicago area law schools indicating that the most elite
schools offered the most interdisciplinary courses).
335. MERTZ, supra note 119, at 54-59. Professor Mertz's exhaustive review
and analysis of recordings from eight first-year contracts classrooms showed,
quite specifically, the ways that professors use subtle conversational cues to
reward students who approached a case from the "correct" perspective, which
emphasized abstract precedential and procedural authority, and punish
students who spoke about cases in a way that emphasized the "irrelevant"
social contexts or narrative concepts from a case. Id.
336. For instance, when my colleague, Jeffrey Van Detta, taught labor law
using a nontraditional collaborative problem solving approach, the students
developed a deep understanding of the law and produced analyses that had a
higher level of sophistication and quality than that seen in the traditionally
taught course. Jeffrey A. Van Detta, CollaborativeProblem-Solving Responsive
to Diverse Learning Styles: Labor Law as an Active Learning Experience, 24
N.C. CENT. L. J. 46, 46-49, 75-78 (2001).

337. Skills and clinical training is, in fact, one area that Professor Mertz
identifies as having a possibility of achieving a counterbalance, by encouraging
other kinds of legal discussions-beyond the casebook method. MERTZ, supra
note 119, at 220-21. The liberating potential that clinical and skills teachers
might bring to bear within legal education is an idea that can be traced back to
Jerome Frank and the Legal Realists movement. Id. at 26. Although clinical
and skills education have been incorporated into modern law school curricula,
the continuing resonance of Frank's ideas is perhaps testament to how little our
legal educational model has changed. That clinical and skills teachers continue
to occupy, in the academy, a lower class than doctrinal casebook method
teachers is an important subject, but it is outside the scope of this Essay.
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suggests, professors teaching case theory can lead students
to develop a critical understanding of the legal system, with
an aim for identifying and sidestepping systemic biases,
with the end goal of developing a strategy that affords the
client the best chance for success. 338 This client-centered
approach is not only practical, it also allows opportunities
for students to visualize the unspoken ways in which the
law's institutional structures replicate and reproduce
existing power structures throughout the law and our
339
society.
These modest suggestions are oriented toward bringing
legal education closer in line with democratic, egalitarian
ideals. The hope is that law graduates will contribute to an
enlightened evolution of the law through critical
reflection--on not merely what the things are that lawyers
do, but also why lawyers do the things they do. By getting
students to see and discuss the hidden processes within our
legal institutions, we can develop a critical discourse which
will, hopefully, chip away at the ingrained habitus, the
invisible glue that holds our unequal society together. 340
Specifically, if students develop a sufficient awareness of
the suffering that the current legal system continues to
cause, despite advances during five centuries in America,
the hope is that they will see the ways in which their
participation in the system contributes to the subordination
of persons of lesser status and will seek alternatives to the
existing structures.341

338. Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-CulturalCompetence in
Lawyers, 8 CLINIcAL L. REV. 33, 88-89 (2001).
339. Elizabeth Mertz suggests, in the context of teaching students how to
talk about the law, that teachers help students reach "a more self-conscious
understanding of the limitations of legal language for apprehending social
phenomena, training students to be wary of the hubris that inheres in law's
aspiration of universal translation across so many diverse social realms."
MERTZ, supranote 119, at 208.
340. See BOURDIEU, supranote 4, at 169-70.
341. This is similar to Peter Gabel's urge to generate a resistance as a
"morally
compelling,
spiritual
activity
rather
than
merely
an
intellectual]political revolt of free individuals against a surrounding false
consciousness." Gabel, supra note 240, at 165.
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CONCLUSION

Legal education contributes to inequalities within the
legal profession and reinforces the representation of the
legal profession as an upper-class profession. Historically,
powerful members of the legal profession joined together
with elite legal educational institutions to accomplish the
expressly stated goal of excluding members of the lower
classes from legal education and the practice of law.
Although overt class-exclusion has disappeared, the legal
profession's elite and exclusionary traditions remain
ensconced within the structure of legal education, cloaked
in terms of professional values and merit-based prestige.
When students do gain admission to a legal educational
institution, they learn that they must behave and dress in
an upper-class way in order to cultivate a "professional"
image. The emphasis on merit encourages students to
internalize the law's hierarchical structure into their
mental consciousness and peacefully accept their place in
the established order. The problem with the c'est la vie
habitus is that no one sees beyond their daily routines to
recognize the unfair sorting process that places them on a
lower rung than others or that those same processes place
others on a lower rung than themselves. Law teachers have
an obligation to study and demystify the processes by which
educational institutions reproduce unequal outcomes, an
endeavor that necessarily includes an evaluation of the law
teacher's role in these processes. It also goes without saying
that law professors should also engender critical
consciousness within their teaching, finding ways to show
students how legal meanings are generated that favor
dominant groups at the expense of weaker groups. If we do
not identify and talk about the ways in which legal
institutions, especially legal educational institutions,
reproduce the law's existing social structures, we enable the
existing inequalities within the legal profession and our
society to continue for subsequent generations.

